The State of Georgia ex rel. Tracy G. Lawson, District Attorney for the Clayton County Judicial Circuit, filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA § 16-14-6 b1 of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act Georgia RICO Act, OCGA § 16-14-1, et seq., against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC collectively, “Singh”, seeking equitable relief afforded by OCGA § 16-14-6 a 1-4, including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh’s property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh’s business and property.2 The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA § 16-14-7. As the basis for relief, the State’s complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the Pure Gas convenience store. The State also alleged that the business was an underground commercial gambling establishment as defined by OCGA § 16-14-3 9 A xvii. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State’s request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State’s request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State’s request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver’s supervision. Hargurtag Singh “Mr. Singh” later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: 1 that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and 2 that the State’s in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. On May 11, 2011, the trial court declined to dismiss the complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 b 6 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA § 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on this Court’s decision in Cisco v. State of Georgia, 285 Ga. 656 680 SE2d 831 2009 and Chief Justice Hunstein’s concurrence in Pittman v. State, 288 Ga. 589 706 SE2d 3982011, the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims Counts I, III, and IV because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Mr. Singh filed a cross appeal.
1. Mr. Singh has moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review as required by OCGA § 5-6-34 b. “It is incumbent upon this Court to inquire into its own jurisdiction.” Cits.” Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642 670 SE2d 425 2008. When some, but not all, claims are dismissed in a case, such dismissal is typically not directly appealable. First Christ Church v. Owens Temple Church, 282 Ga. 883, 884 655 SE2d 605 2008. However, the appealability of an order is ultimately determined by its substance and effect, not its nomenclature. Id. at 885. Here, the State contends that when the trial court found the proceeding pursuant to OCGA § 16-14-6 to be unconstitutional and dismissed the claims against the in personam defendants, the ruling effectively dismissed the temporary injunctive relief and the receivership as to all defendants. As such, the State argues it was entitled to a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 a 4 and was not required to seek interlocutory review pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 b. We agree. OCGA § 5-6-34 a 4 provides that appeals may be taken from “all judgments or orders granting or refusing applications for receivers or for interlocutory or final injunctions.” Since equitable relief cannot be had against defendants in rem Knott v. Evans, 280 Ga. 515 2 630 SE2d 402 2006, the ruling effectively denied all injunctive and equitable relief as to all defendants. As such, the trial court’s order falls into the category of direct appeals allowed pursuant to OCGA §5-6-34 a 4 and the case is properly before this Court. Accordingly, Mr. Singh’s motion to dismiss the State’s appeal is denied.
