Riggs v. State

Darren David Riggs, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea. On appeal, Riggs contends that i his plea was involuntary. Riggs further contends that the trial court erred in ii denying his motion to discharge appointed counsel and to proceed pro se, iii denying several pre-trial motions, and iv intervening in plea negotiations. In addition, Riggs contends that v trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.1 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

After sentencing, “a guilty plea may only be withdrawn if the defendant establishes that such withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice—ineffective assistance of counsel or an involuntary or unknowingly entered guilty plea.” Footnote omitted. Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 433, 434 1 691 SE2d 308 2010. The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence, and its refusal to allow a withdrawal will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Lawton v. State, 285 Ga. App. 45, 46 645 SE2d 571 2007.