On September 26, 2005, Allen Morris was fatally shot with a crossbow, and Timothy Leroy Wilkie was arrested as a result. Wilkie has been represented by counsel since September 27, 2005. On October 11, 2005, Wilkie waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was released on bond the following day. He was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault on September 22, 2009 and was arrested on a grand jury warrant on September 30, 2009. Wilkie was denied bail on October 5, 2009, and his motion for reconsideration of bail was denied on October 22, 2009. On April 29, 2010, he pled not guilty to the charges in the indictment, and on January 18, 2011, he filed a motion for discharge and acquittal and plea in bar alleging that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on April 4, 2011, and Wilkie appeals directly from that order. Callaway v. State , 275 Ga. 332 567 SE2d 13 2002. “In examining an alleged denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, courts must engage in a balancing test with the following factors being considered: 1 the length of the delay; 2 the reasons for the delay; 3 the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4 prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972. The existence of no one factor is either necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and a trial court’s findings of fact and its weighing of disputed facts will be afforded deference on appeal.” Cit. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. Cit. Fallen v. State , 289 Ga. 247-248 710 SE2d 559 2011. Length of the Delay . “The length of the delay ‘actually figures into the speedy trial analysis in two respects.’ Cit.” Scandrett v. State , 279 Ga. 632, 633 1 a 619 SE2d 603 2005. “First, a court must determine whether the delay ‘has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from “presumptively prejudicial” delay, since, by definition, the accused cannot complain that the government has denied him a “speedy” trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.’ Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 652 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992. If the delay passes this threshold test of ‘presumptive prejudice,’ then the Barker inquiry is triggered. The delay is then considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis, with ‘the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifying over time.’ Doggett , supra at 652. . . . However, the presumptive prejudice arising from delay ‘cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.’ Doggett , supra at 656. Instead, ‘it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.’ Cit.” Cit. Fallen v. State , supra at 248 1. Calculated from Wilkie’s arrest on September 26, 2005 to the denial of the motion for discharge and acquittal on April 4, 2011, “the delay in this case . . . is . . . five and a half years. Cit. The trial court . . . correctly ruled that this delay of far more than one year was presumptively prejudicial, requiring full analysis of the Barker factors. Cit.” State v. Pickett , 288 Ga. 674, 675-676 2 b 706 SE2d 561 2011. ” ‘The State does not challenge the trial court’s finding that the pretrial delay at issue should weigh against the State as uncommonly long.’ Cit.” State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 527 2 c 1 705 SE2d 636 2011. “ As a result, the remaining Barker factors must be considered. Cit.” Fallen v. State , supra.
Reason for the Delay . Wilkie argues that the State was not actively investigating the case the entire time preceding return of the indictment. However, the testimony at the hearing supported the trial court’s finding that this “case was difficult, complex, and not just any ordinary street crime. Cit.” The investigator and the prosecutor obtained information that the victim was killed for insurance proceeds, and during the period at issue, they were seeking and receiving records from insurance and financial institutions. The evidence here supports the trial court’s finding that the . . . years prior to indictment were used for investigation. Moreover, even if the State had not investigated the case further during those . . . years, there is no evidence that the State intentionally delayed the indictment or trial, and delay due to negligence or workloads is weighed lightly against the State, as the trial court lightly weighed the delay here. Cit. Sweatman v. State , 287 Ga. 872, 875 4 700 SE2d 579 2010. See also Hassel v. State , 284 Ga. 861, 862 b 672 SE2d 627 2009. Compare State v. Gleaton , 288 Ga. 373, 375 703 SE2d 642 2010.
