Douglas Fullmer Goffaux appeals from the trial court’s order denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss his indictment for child molestation on the ground that the State violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we vacate the order denying the motion and remand the case for reconsideration by the trial court. Goffaux was arrested on August 2, 2007, on the charge of child molestation, released on bond the following day, and indicted on one count of child molestation on February 4, 2011. He plead not guilty on March 25, 2011, retained defense counsel for the first time on March 30, 2011, and filed his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial on April 15, 2011. The trial court denied the motion on July 20, 2011, and Goffaux appealed.
In considering a defendant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the trial court is required to decide as a threshold matter whether the delay at issue was long enough to create “presumptive prejudice.” Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 651 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992; Scandrett v. State , 279 Ga. 632, 633 619 SE2d 603 2005; Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52, 55 663 SE2d 189 2008. If the delay was not long enough to create presumptive prejudice, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. Id. A delay long enough to be presumptively prejudicial triggers a requirement that the trial court analyze the speedy trial claim by balancing the conduct of the state and the defendant under four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972: 1 whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long; 2 whether the state or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; 3 whether, in due course, the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and 4 whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Doggett , 505 U. S. at 651-652. Furthermore, after making a threshold determination that the delay was long enough to create presumptive prejudice, the trial court must consider the delay a second time as part of the prejudice factor of the four-factor Barker analysis. Boseman v. State , 263 Ga. 730, 732 438 SE2d 626 1994. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on appeal, no single factor is necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and we afford deference to the trial court’s findings of fact and weighing of disputed facts. Williams v. State , 277 Ga. 598, 599 592 SE2d 848 2004. “We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.” Fallen v. State , 289 Ga. 247, 248 710 SE2d 559 2011.
