Bernard Harrison III was indicted for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer by offering violence, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and interference with government property. A jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor obstruction on the first charge and guilty of the remaining two charges. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals only as to his conviction for interference with government property. Harrison contends that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury and in denying his motion in limine. He also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. The facts, construed to support the jury’s verdict, show that two Douglas County sheriff’s deputies attempted to execute an arrest warrant for a probation violation on Harrison. After unsuccessfully visiting Harrison’s home, they located him at a nearby swimming pool and informed him that he was under arrest. Harrison asked for permission to put on his clothes, which were lying on a chair about five feet from the pool, and the deputies allowed him to do so. But after Harrison sat down to put on his shoes and a deputy told him he could not hug his girlfriend goodbye, he stood up and “bolted.” One of the deputies grabbed him, he “whipped the deputy around,” they struggled on the edge of the pool, and then both fell into the water. Harrison freed himself from the officer in the water, emerged from the pool, and ran toward the gate. The second officer attempted to stop Harrison, made contact with him, and fell to the ground with Harrison, breaking his glasses and sustaining cuts and abrasions on his face. Harrison again freed himself and fled through the gate, not to be seen again until he turned himself in several days later. The fall into the pool ruined the officer’s cell phone and damaged his new walkie-talkie, both the property of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department. The deputy testified that the property was damaged while Harrison was obstructing and hindering his attempts to arrest him.
1. Harrison first asserts that the trial court erred in giving the charge: “An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of an act of the defendant.”1 Harrison contends that a causation analysis is inapplicable to the offense of interference with government property.