Appellant Lillian Walker challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion for discharge and acquittal under the speedy trial statute for capital cases, OCGA § 17-7-171. This case requires us to decide whether, following a defendant’s demand for speedy trial, § 17-7-171 b requires only two, or more than two, full terms of court to pass without a trial before the defendant is entitled to discharge and acquittal assuming the other requirements of the statute have been met. Although several prior appellate decisions involving § 17-7-171 have said in dicta that only two terms must pass, § 17-7-171 b plainly says that “more than two” terms of court must expire, and we must follow the statutory text instead of those inaccurate dicta. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal was premature. 1. The Superior Court of Peach County has three terms of court a year, which begin in March, August, and November. See OCGA § 15-6-3 23. During the August 2009 term of that court, Appellant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and theft by taking a motor vehicle. During the same term, Appellant filed a statutory demand for speedy trial. Because she is charged with three crimes that are “capital offenses” for speedy trial purposes, her demand is governed by OCGA § 17-7-171. See Turner v. State , 269 Ga. 392, 393 497 SE2d 560 1998 holding that murder is a “capital offense” for purposes of § 17-7-171; White v. State , 202 Ga. App. 370, 371 414 SE2d 296 1991 holding that armed robbery is a “capital offense” for purposes of § 17-7-171; Cleary v. State , 258 Ga. 203, 205 366 SE2d 677 1988 holding that “where a multi-count indictment includes both capital and noncapital offenses, the time for trial upon a proper demand by a defendant is the time allowed under OCGA § 17-7-171 for the more serious offenses”, disapproved in part on other grounds, Mize v. State , 262 Ga. 489, 490 n.1 422 SE2d 180 1992.
In the two terms of court November 2009 and March 2010 that followed the term in which Appellant filed her speedy trial demand, no trial occurred. The third term August 2010 also expired without a trial; however, during that term, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On February 1, 2011, in the fourth term November 2010 following the one in which Appellant’s demand was filed, Appellant filed a motion for discharge and acquittal, contending that, because two terms had expired after the filing of her demand, she was entitled to be automatically discharged and acquitted under OCGA § 17-7-171 b. The parties stipulated that at all of these terms of court juries were “impaneled and qualified to try the defendant.” Id.
