The Housing Authority of Fulton County terminated the employment of its chief executive officer, Jonathan Jones, ostensibly for cause, and Jones then sued the Authority for breach of his employment agreement, alleging that his termination was, in fact, without cause and that the Authority failed to pay him certain compensation and benefits due under the agreement. The Authority moved for summary judgment, and Jones moved for partial summary judgment on his claim for unpaid compensation and benefits. The court below awarded summary judgment to the Authority, denied partial summary judgment to Jones, and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the Authority. Jones now appeals, but we find no error and affirm the judgment below. The standard for summary judgment is settled and familiar. “Summary judgment is warranted when any material fact is undisputed, as shown by the pleadings and record evidence, and this fact entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Strength v. Lovett , 311 Ga. App. 35, 39 2 714 SE2d 723 2011; see also Cowart v. Widener , 287 Ga. 622, 623 1 a 697 SE2d 779 2010. So, as we have explained before, “to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific material fact and that this specific fact is enough, regardless of any other facts in the case, to entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” Strength , 311 Ga. App. at 39 2. We review an award of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the record, as well as all inferences that might reasonably be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cowart , 287 Ga. at 624 1 a.
So viewed, the record shows that the Authority is an agency that helps low-to-moderate-income families obtain affordable housing in Fulton County, and Jones served as its chief executive officer from May 2005 until November 2009. During that time, Jones was responsible for, among other things, “assuring that Authority activities are within federal and state laws, regulations, policies, and procedures” and “directly supervising the Senior Director/Directors,” and Jones had “ultimate responsibility for all federal programs” in which the Authority participated.1 According to his employment agreement, if Jones “performed any act that is materially harmful to the business of the Authority,” the Authority was permitted to terminate his employment for cause, meaning that Jones would be entitled to his base compensation through the date of termination and nothing more.
