After a jury found Michael Palmer not guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia of the federal offenses of armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, the State of Georgia secured an indictment charging Palmer with fifteen violations of Georgia law arising out of the same July 20, 2009 bank robbery. Palmer filed a motion in autrefois acquit, arguing that eight of the state counts, those charging him with armed robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offenses, are barred under OCGA § 16-1-8 c, which prohibits prosecution when the accused was formerly prosecuted in federal court for the same conduct. After a hearing, the trial court denied Palmer’s motion, and he appeals, contending that the state armed robbery and aggravated assault charges are for the same conduct as the federal armed bank robbery charge and that the state firearms charges are for the same conduct as the federal firearms charge. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. The United States is constitutionally prohibited from putting any person in jeopardy of life or liberty twice for the same offense; likewise, the State of Georgia is bound by the rule against double jeopardy.1 These provisions protect a person not only from multiple punishments by a single sovereign for the same offense but also from successive prosecutions by a single sovereign for the same offense.2 It is well settled, however, that when a person in a single act breaks the law of two sovereigns, such as the United States and the State of Georgia, the person has committed two distinct offenses and may be prosecuted and punished by each sovereign for the violation of its law.3 Under this doctrine of dual sovereignty, successive prosecutions by two separate sovereigns for the same offense do not violate double jeopardy.4
Like many states,5 Georgia law provides a statutory limitation on the dual sovereignty doctrine. OCGA § 16-1-8 c provides that a prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted in a district court of the United States for a crime which is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state if such former prosecution resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal and the subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution or unless the crime was not consummated when the former trial began. In applying OCGA § 16-1-8 c, the “threshold” question is whether the prior federal prosecution was for a crime that was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the State of Georgia. Sullivan v. State , 279 Ga. 893, 894 1 622 SE2d 823 2005. Where concurrent jurisdiction is absent, “OCGA § 16-1-8 c is inapplicable regardless of any overlap in the accused’s conduct that is the subject matter of the two prosecutions.” Citations and footnote omitted. Id.
