A contractual dispute between the City of Savannah and its contractor, appellee Batson-Cook Company, and a sub-contractor, appellee Raito, Inc., concerning the design and construction of an underground parking garage in Chatham County resulted in the return of a multi-million-dollar jury verdict against the City and the entry of judgment thereon in Troup County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co. , 310 Ga. App. 878 714 SE2d 242 2011. We granted the City’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to decide whether that court erred when it determined the trial judge did not err when, having been presented with a motion to recuse him, he denied the motion rather than refer it to another judge. In the order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari, we asked the parties to address “whether the factual allegations presented on the motion to recuse were legally sufficient to require the motion to be presented to another judge for decision.” “All parties before the court have the right to an impartial judicial officer.” Stephens v. Stephens , 249 Ga. 700, 702 292 SE2d 689 1982. The issue of judicial disqualification can rise to a constitutional level since “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison , 349 U.S. 133, 136 75 SC 623, 99 LE 942 1955. See also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. , 556 U.S. 868 129 SC 2252, 173 LE2d 1208 2009. Judicial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order” because the power and prerogative of a court to resolve disputes rests upon the respect accorded by citizens to a court’s judgments which, in turn, depends upon the issuing court’s absolute probity. Id., at 889. “If the public lacks confidence in the impartiality of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial decisions voluntarily, the notion that ‘we are a government of laws’ would necessarily collapse.” Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias , 2011 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 943, 968. It is vital to the functioning of the courts that the public believe in the absolute integrity and impartiality of its judges see Smith v. Guest Pond Club , 277 Ga. 143, 146 586 SE2d 623 2003, and judicial recusal serves as a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a court should be fair and impartial. 2011 B.Y.U.L.Rev., supra, at 949.1
States may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than required by due process, and because state statutes and state codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification and recusal of judges rarely implicate the constitutional standard. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. , supra, 556 U.S. at 889. The codes of judicial conduct adopted by the States2 “serve to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law” id., and should be construed and applied to further the preservation of the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 1, Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. Judges are “to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” Canon 2A and “must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. . . .” Commentary on Canon 2A. See also McElhanon v. Hing , 151 Ariz. 403, 412 728 P2d 273, 282 1986 “justice must not only be done fairly but . . . must be perceived as having been fairly done”.
