This appeal arises from an action filed by Myrna Feldman against Arcadis G&M, Inc., Geraghty & Miller, Inc., and Piedmont, Olsen, Hensley, Inc., collectively “Arcadis” for negligent planning and design of a section of roadway upon which Feldman was later injured by a drunk driver. The trial court granted summary judgment to Arcadis after determining that the eight-year statute of repose codified in OCGA § 9-3-51 applied to the claims at issue and barred Feldman’s recovery as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. On appeal, Feldman contends that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory language of OCGA § 9-3-51 applied to the design plan for the stretch of roadway upon which she was injured because the roadway is not “an improvement to real property,” to which the statute of repose applies. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.1 So viewed, the undisputed facts establish that Piedmont, Olsen, Hensley, Inc., a predecessor to the current-day Arcadis US, Inc. f/k/a Arcadis G&M, Inc., provided Gwinnett County, Georgia, with engineering and design work on the Lawrenceville-Suwanee Road Extension “the Extension” in or around 1997. Construction of the Extension was completed in 1999,2 and Feldman was later injured by an out-of-control drunk driver in January 2009. Feldman alleged that the negligence of Arcadis in designing the particular stretch of the Extension resulted in her injuries.
Upon motion for summary judgment filed by Arcadis, the trial court determined that based on the language of the statute, the test set forth in Mullis v. Southern Co. Svcs. ,3 and persuasive case law, the Extension constituted “an improvement to real property” such that the eight-year statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-51 applied to bar Feldman’s recovery from Arcadis.4