After Cozy Blackmon, a one-year-old child, died from hot water burns suffered while in the care of appellant Beauprue Montford, Montford was indicted on charges of felony murder Counts 1-3, aggravated battery Count 4, aggravated assault Count 5, and cruelty to children in the first degree Count 6. On June 20, 2011, following a hearing at which he was represented by counsel, Montford entered a negotiated guilty plea to Count 1, reduced to involuntary manslaughter, and to Counts 4, 5, and 6; and the state nol-prossed the other two felony murder counts Counts 2 and 3. Montford was sentenced, in accordance with the state’s recommendation, to a total of 25 years to serve 10 years on Count 1; 20 years on each of Counts 4 and 5, concurrent with Count 1; and 15 years on Count 6, consecutive to Count 1. Montford asked to withdraw his guilty plea in a pro se letter to the court dated June 27, 2011. He was appointed new counsel, who filed a formal motion to withdraw on his behalf. Following a hearing, the motion was denied. Montford now brings this out-of-time appeal,1 asserting that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We find no error and affirm.
Because Montford had already been sentenced when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, he could withdraw his plea only to correct a manifest injustice,2 such as would exist, for example, where “the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.”3 On a defendant’s challenge to the validity of his guilty plea, the state bears the burden of showing that the defendant offered his plea “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”4 The state may sustain this burden by showing from the record of the guilty plea hearing “that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea.”5 Because a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, it will not be disturbed on appellate review absent a manifest abuse of such discretion.6 Moreover, in ruling on the motion, “the trial court is the final arbiter of all factual disputes raised by the evidence. If evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we must affirm.”7
