Kurt A. Floyd, Sr. and Livia M. Floyd were divorced in 2008. The decree of divorce incorporates the settlement of the parties, in which Kurt and Livia agreed that Kurt would retain title to, and possession of, the marital residence. The decree and incorporated settlement required Kurt to refinance the existing mortgage on the marital residence and to use the proceeds to pay Livia for her share of the equity. If Kurt were unwilling or unable to refinance the marital residence, the decree and incorporated settlement required him, within 90 days of the entry of the decree, to list the marital residence for sale at its fair market value or a price mutually agreeable to the parties. On cross-motions for contempt, the court below found that Kurt violated the terms of the decree in several respects, including by failing to refinance or list the marital residence, and it held Kurt in contempt of the decree. The court directed Kurt to purge his contempt with respect to the marital residence by making a quitclaim deed for the residence in favor of Livia. Kurt appeals from the contempt order, as well as the denial of his cross-motion for contempt.1
1. We turn first to the contention that the court below impermissibly modified the decree by directing Kurt to purge his contempt by executing a quitclaim deed in favor of Livia. It is settled that, “while the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the decree has been violated and has authority to interpret and clarify the decree, it does not have the power in a contempt proceeding to modify the terms of the agreement or decree.” Jett v. Jett, 291 Ga. 56, 58 2 727 SE2d 470 2012 citation and punctuation omitted. See also Greenwood v. Greenwood, 289 Ga. 163, 164 709 SE2d 803 2011. “Although the contempt order may seem reasonable, it violates the firm rule we have established against modifying the property division provisions of a final divorce decree.” Doane v. LeCornu, 289 Ga. 379, 381 1 711 SE2d 673 2011 citation and punctuation omitted. “Those provisions equitably divide marital property between the parties, and we have not allowed trial courts later to compel a party who was awarded a specific asset to sell or otherwise convert that asset in order to comply with some other provision of the decree.” Darroch v. Willis, 286 Ga. 566, 570-571 3 690 SE2d 410 2010 citations omitted. The divorce decree in this case does not specify that the marital residence is to be conveyed to Livia if Kurt fails to comply with his obligation to either refinance or list it. Consequently, the requirement in the contempt order that Kurt execute a quitclaim deed in favor of Livia amounts to an impermissible modification, not an interpretation, of the divorce decree, and that portion of the contempt order must be reversed. Doane, 289 Ga. at 381 1.
