Alfred J. Hight, pro se, appeals from the order denying, among other things, his extraordinary motion for new trial. In 1974, Hight was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and kidnapping with bodily injury, and sentenced to three consecutive life sentences. Hight declined representation at trial, and following his conviction, did not file a motion for new trial or appeal. In December of 2008, he, pro se, filed an “extraordinary motion for new trial; motion to correct void illegal sentences; and motion for an order expunging blank and untried indictments from defendant’s files.” He also filed a separate motion for appointment for counsel. Without holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motions on April 30, 2009, and Hight filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court on May 14, 2009. He subsequently filed an application for discretionary appeal in this Court on June 30, 2009, which this Court dismissed as untimely.1 The Supreme Court transferred the first appeal to this Court, and it was docketed in this Court on May 6, 2010.2 1. Although Hight contends as error the trial court’s denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial, we do not agree. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-5-41a, “when a motion for a new trial is made after the expiration of a 30 day period from the entry of judgment, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not made during such period, which reason shall be judged by the court.” “Normally, of course, the good reason necessary to permit the filing of an extraordinary motion for new trial consists of newly discovered evidence. However, the late filing of a motion for new trial may also be predicated on circumstances other than newly discovered evidence.” Franz v. State , 208 Ga. App. 677, 678 2 432 SE2d 554 1993.
Hight, in essence, asserted in his extraordinary motion for new trial that he was forced to proceed at trial without the assistance of counsel, and not apprised of the “disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.” The record belies this contention as it reflects that when Hight’s private counsel withdrew from the case, the trial court appointed Hight a public defender, but Hight refused representation. The public defender was permitted to withdraw before trial, but the trial court directed that a public defender remain with Hight during the trial and be “available to advise him.” Here, clearly Hight’s failure to file a motion for new trial was a circumstance created entirely by his refusal to accept appointed counsel. See Cannon v. State , 175 Ga. App. 741, 742 334 SE2d 342 1985 A convicted party may, by his own conduct, forfeit his right to appeal by sleeping on his rights.
