Lee Otis Colson appeals pro se from the trial court’s order dismissing his “motion to vacate/correct a void sentence.” We affirm because Colson has failed to assert any colorable claim that his sentence was void. A Wilcox County grand jury indicted Colson for the crime of escape. On December 14, 1998, Colson entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to ten years, five to be served concurrently with any other sentence he was serving, and five to be served consecutively to any such sentence. In 2003, he moved to modify his sentence, contending that the five years to be served consecutively constituted a void sentence and should be vacated. That motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction. In 2010, he filed the subject motion, again asserting that his sentence is void and seeking a declaration that it should have run concurrently with his previous conviction from December of 1998.1
The trial court treated Colson’s motion as a motion to vacate a void judgment and dismissed it pursuant to Harper v. State , 286 Ga. 216 686 SE2d 786 2009. But, as Harper acknowledges, id. at 217 n.1, a void sentence may be attacked at any time. See Williams v. State , 271 Ga. 686, 688 1 523 SE2d 857 1999. The dismissal, however, was nevertheless correct because the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify a sentence after the expiration of the term of court during which the sentence was entered, unless the sentence was void. Anderson v. State , 251 Ga. App. 785, 786 554 SE2d 811 2001. Here, Colson’s sentence is not void. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. Nevertheless, when the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range of punishment, the sentence is not void and is not subject to post-appeal modification beyond that provided in OCGA § 17-10-1 f. Upon the expiration of the period provided in OCGA § 17-10-1 f, post-appeal pleadings filed in the sentencing court seeking sentence modification must set forth why the sentence is void, i.e., how it imposes punishment the law does not allow. Citations and punctuation omitted. Hughes v. State , 273 Ga. App. 705, 705-706 615 SE2d 819 2005. Colson’s sentence was within the statutory range of punishment permitted by OCGA § 16-10-52 b 1 “a person who, having been convicted of a felony, is convicted of the offense of escape shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.”
