Lynette Greene, individually and in her capacity as executrix of her deceased husband Lloyd Greene’s estate, sought a declaratory judgment regarding a 1994 deed which conveyed real property to her and her husband. The trial court entered an order declaring 1 that the deed conveyed to Lynette and Lloyd Greene a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship; and 2 that Lynette Greene was the “sole owner” of the property. Ernest Greene, an heir under Lloyd Greene’s will, appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which transferred the case to this Court. For reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s declaration that the deed conveyed a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, but we affirm the court’s declaration regarding Lynette Greene’s ownership of the property. “The construction of a deed, including the determination of the nature of the estate conveyed, is a question of law for the court.”1 We review the trial court’s construction de novo.2 “In construing a deed, the court’s overriding goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.”3 Generally, the parties’ intent is determined solely from the text of the deed.4 Where the language in the deed is unambiguous, a court must enforce the deed as written.5
The deed in this case provided that Lloyd and Lynette Greene took the property “as tenants in common, for and during their joint lives, and, upon the death of either of them, then to the survivor of them, in fee simple, together with every contingent remainder and right of reversion, and to the heirs and assigns of said survivor.” This language accomplished two things. First, it conveyed to Lloyd and Lynette Greene a life estate in the property,6 as tenants in common; this life estate terminated upon the death of either of them.7 Second, the language of the deed conveyed a fee simple estate in remainder to the surviving grantee.8 Accordingly, upon Lloyd Greene’s death, the Greenes’ life estate in the property ended and fee simple title to the property vested in Lynette Greene.9
