This is a direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Appellants Kevin Brewington, Tyrone Brown, and Gary Brown were identified as accomplices in the March 2006 shooting deaths of Norris Degree and Stanley Brown at an apartment building in Clayton County. Brewington and Tyrone Brown were arrested and incarcerated in March 2006, while Gary Brown was arrested and incarcerated in November 2006. Brewington and Gary Brown were tried from November 16, 2009 to November 24, 2009, with the matter resulting in a mistrial due to a hung jury. Tyrone Brown, whose case was severed from the November 2009 trial of his co-defendants, has yet to be tried. In June 2009, prior to their trial, appellants Brewington and Gary Brown filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds, the trial court denied the motion on August 25, 2009, and appellants did not appeal. On December 2, 2009, shortly after the mistrial was declared, appellants Brewington and Gary Brown filed another motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Meanwhile, the trial court specially set the new trial for March 15, 2010. On March 11, 2010, Tyrone Brown orally joined his co-defendants’ motion. On March 16, 2010, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and each appellant filed an appeal.
1. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial. . . .” This right is enshrined in the Georgia Constitution and is co-extensive with the federal guarantee made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. XIa; Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52 2 663 SE2d 189 2008. Every constitutional speedy trial claim is subject to a two-tiered analysis as set forth in the United States Supreme Court decisions Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972 and Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647 II 112 SC 2686 120 LE2d 520 1992. As for the first tier of the analysis, it must be determined if the delay in question is presumptively prejudicial. If not, there has been no violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the second tier of analysis is unnecessary. See Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. at 530 “Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”; Bowling v. State , 285 Ga. 43 1 a 673 SE2d 194 2009. If, however, the delay is determined to be presumptively prejudicial, then the court must engage the second tier of analysis by applying a four-factor balancing test to the facts of the case. Jakupovic v. State , 287 Ga. 205 1 695 SE2d 247 2010. Those four factors include: 1 whether the delay is uncommonly long; 2 Reason for delay/whether the government or the defendant is more responsible; 3 defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; 4 and the prejudice to the defendant. Ruffin v. State , supra, 284 Ga. at 56 2b. On appeal, the relevant standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 65; Bowling v. State , supra, 285 Ga. at 47 2.
