We granted the interlocutory application of Brian Tatis to review the trial court’s denial of a motion for bond Tatis filed pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-50.1 The statute provides that any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury having jurisdiction over the accused person; . . . In the event no grand jury considers the charges against the accused person within the 90 day period of confinement . . ., the accused shall have bail set upon application to the court. This appeal requires the Court to construe the statute to determine what constitutes “confinement” that triggers the 90-day period within which the case of an unindicted and confined arrestee must be considered by the grand jury. Warrants for appellant’s arrest for “Homicide-Murder 16-5-1″ and “Armed Robbery 16-8-41″ were issued by a magistrate judge on November 16, 2010, and appellant was arrested on November 23, 2010. Because he injured himself in an attempt to avoid arrest, appellant was handcuffed to a stretcher and transported immediately following his arrest to Grady Memorial Hospital, where he received treatment for two broken ankles. After two days of hospitalization, appellant was taken from the hospital to the Fulton County jail where he was booked into the jail on November 25. The Fulton County grand jury returned a true bill of indictment against appellant on February 22, 2011, 92 days after he was arrested and taken to the hospital and 90 days after he was booked into the county jail.2 On February 23, appellant filed a motion for a reasonable bond to be set pursuant to § 17-7-50. The trial court heard argument on the motion and denied it. On appeal, appellant argues that his confinement began when he was at Grady Hospital where the sheriff’s office had a facility for inmates and where, it is undisputed, arrestees in need of medical treatment are handcuffed to hospital beds and guarded by sheriff’s deputies. Citing our decisions in Richardson v. St. Lawrence , 289 Ga. 149 709 SE2d 802 2011, and Bryant v. Vowell , 282 Ga. 437 651 SE2d 77 2007, overruled on other grounds in Brown v. Crawford , __Ga.__ 2011 WL 4008328, decided 9/12/11, and State v. English , 276 Ga. 343 3 578 SE2d 413 2003, the State takes the position that appellant was not confined until he was incarcerated in the Fulton County jail two days after he was arrested.
“In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly” OCGA § 1-3-1a, giving “ordinary signification” to all words that are not terms of art. OCGA § 1-3-1b. In enacting the predecessor of § 17-5-70 in 1973, the legislature expressly stated the purpose of the law: one who is arrested for a crime and not released on bail is entitled to have the charge or accusation against him heard by a grand jury and is entitled to have bail set if the grand jury does not consider the charges against the accused “within the ninety-day period of confinement” and the accused seeks bail. Ga. L. 1973, pp. 291-292. Thus, OCGA § 17-7-50 ensures that a person whose arrest was not precipitated by grand jury indictment, i.e., a person who was arrested on a prosecutor’s information or, as in appellant’s case, on an arrest warrant obtained by a law enforcement officer, and who has been confined since his arrest, has his case presented to the grand jury within 90 days of arrest or has bail set by the trial court upon the arrestee’s motion after the expiration of the 90-day period. Bryant v. Vowell , supra, 282 Ga. at 439.3
