This is one of multiple actions filed by Gege Odion claiming that Sabi Varon “Sabi” and entities controlled by him, Highland Financial Capital Group, LLC “Highland” and Candler Point, LLC “CPL”, usurped Odion’s business opportunity to purchase property known as 2855 Candler Road, Decatur the “2855 Property” and purchased the property themselves.1 At issue in this appeal is the pro se action filed by Odion on May 13, 2010, and amended on July 6, 2010. Count 1 of the amended complaint alleges that Sabi, Highland, and CPL violated the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act BRRETA;2 Count II asserts civil Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations “RICO” Act violations;3 Count III alleges breach of trust; and Count IV seeks an accounting. Odion’s amended complaint purported to add numerous defendants without obtaining leave of court,4 and Counts II-IV were brought against all defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims against all defendants, and Odion appeals, contending that the court committed a variety of errors. We affirm. 1. The trial court dismissed all counts against CPL on the ground that they were filed in violation of an automatic bankruptcy stay provided by 11 USC § 362. Odion enumerates this ruling as error in his first enumeration. Applying the de novo standard of review,5 we affirm.
The record shows that when the original complaint was filed on May 13, 2010, CPL was a debtor in bankruptcy, having filed a Chapter 11 petition on January 5, 2010. In general, actions filed in violation of a federal bankruptcy stay are considered void ab initio in Georgia.6 Odion argues that because CPL’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed on June 28, 2010, and CPL had not yet been served with process, there was no pending action against it at the time the automatic stay was in effect, so the trial court erred in ruling that the complaint as to CPL was void. This argument fails. Although an action is not a “pending” suit until after service of process is perfected, once service is accomplished, it relates back to the date of filing, and the date of filing establishes the date the action is commenced.7 Thus, the action against CPL was commenced on May 13, 2010, and the automatic stay was in effect at that time,8 rendering the claims against CPL void ab initio.
