In 2004, appellants Stephen and Linda Pollman purchased a Savannah townhome built by appellee Swan Construction in a condominium complex owned and developed by appellee Forest River. Appellee Louise Swan was a principal in both corporations. Appellee Neighborhood Realty listed the condominum for sale and marketed it through appellees Rebecca Holcombe and Marie Harbuck. Fourteen months after closing the real-estate transaction, the Pollmans filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act RICO. OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq..1 In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all defendants on the contract, negligence and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. Pollman v. Swan , 305 Ga. App. 369 1, 3 699 SE2d 582 2010. In affirming the grants of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals ruled that summary judgment on the RICO claim involving allegations of mail and wire fraud was appropriate because there was no proof of mail fraud in the absence of proof of reliance by the Pollmans. Id., at Div. 3. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract and negligence due to the purported failure of appellants to demonstrate evidence of damages, noting that there was “no evidence showing the cost of repairs or difference in market value at the time the injury or breach occurred. . . .” Id., at 371 Div. 1. This Court granted the Pollmans’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, expressing concern about the rationale employed to affirm the grant of summary judgment on the RICO claim alleging mail fraud as a predicate act and about the rationale concerning proof of damages used to affirm the grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract and negligence claims.
1. Both the trial court in granting summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail and wire fraud and the Court of Appeals in affirming the grant of summary judgment relied on Markowitz v. Wieland , 243 Ga. App. 151 2b 532 SE2d 705 2000, and concluded that the Pollmans could not show mail and wire fraud because they could not prove their detrimental reliance on the misrepresentations purportedly made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See Pollman v. Swan , supra, 305 Ga. App. at 374. However, in Bridge v. Phoenix Bonding & Indemnity Co. , 553 U.S. 639 128 SC 2131, 170 LE2d 1012 2008, the U. S. Supreme Court construed the federal mail fraud statute in connection with the federal RICO Act 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. and held that the common-law requirement of justifiable reliance in fraud is not a requirement of the mail fraud statute. Appellees concede that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Phoenix Bonding controls since “racketeering activity” is defined in the Georgia RICO Act as being, in pertinent part, “any conduct defined as ‘racketeering activity’ under 18 U.S.C. Section 19611 . . .B. . . .” OCGA § 16-14-39Axxix. Since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
