Following a bench trial, Hong Investments, LLC “Hong” appeals from the trial court’s judgment finding unenforceable a personal guaranty signed by Michael Sarsfield. Because the trial court erred in its conclusion, we reverse. “The trial court is the trier of fact in a bench trial, and its findings will be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support them. The plain legal error standard of review applies where the appellate court determines that the issue was of law, not fact.” Citations and punctuation omitted. Slaick v. Arnold , 307 Ga. App. 410 705 SE2d 206 2010. Applying this standard here, the record reveals that Hong entered into a lease agreement with TDC-Berkeley Lake, LLC, d/b/a Three Dollar Cafe “Three Dollar Cafe” dated November 27, 2007, in which Hong was listed as the landlord and Three Dollar Cafe the tenant. Sarsfield signed the lease as manager of the tenant under the printed name “TDC-Berkeley Lake, LLC, d/b/a Three Dollar Cafe, a Georgia limited liability company.” Although there is no date shown for Sarsfield’s execution of the lease, Hong signed it on November 27, 2007. On November 28, 2007, Sarfield signed a personal guaranty agreeing to pay the “Landlord” rent in the event that the “Tenant” defaults on the “Lease.” The guaranty did not identify the “Landlord,” “Tenant,” or “Lease.”
When Three Dollar Cafe defaulted on the lease, Hong attempted to recover unpaid rent pursuant to the personal guaranty signed by Sarsfield. During a bench trial on the matter, Sarsfield admitted signing both the lease and the guaranty, and stated that the only issue he disputed was the amount owed to Hong. The trial court, in entering judgment in favor of Sarsfield, found that “the personal guaranty is unenforceable as it fails to identify the principal debtor or sufficiently identify the party whose debt is being guaranteed.” It is from this order that Hong appeals. The statute of frauds requires that a promise to answer for the debt of another, in order to be binding on the promisor, must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. This requirement has been interpreted to mandate further that a guaranty identify the debt, the principal debtor, the promisor, and the promisee. Even where the intent of the parties is manifestly obvious, where any of these names is omitted from the document, the agreement is not enforceable because it fails to satisfy the statute of frauds. Citations and punctuation omitted. LaFarge Building Materials v. Pratt , 307 Ga. App. 767, 768-769 706 SE2d 131 2011; see Dabbs v. Key Equipment Finance , 303 Ga. App. 570, 572 694 SE2d 161 2010; see also OCGA § 13-5-30 2. But OCGA § 24-6-3 a provides: “All contemporaneous writings shall be admissible to explain each other.” And “as long as all the necessary terms are contained in signed contemporaneous writings, the statutory requirements and purpose of the Statute of Frauds have been met, whether or not the writings are cross-referenced.” Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted. Dabbs , supra, 303 Ga. App. at 573.
