Duncan Wells, M.D., performed hip replacement surgery on Frances Dendy, and during the procedure her sciatic nerve became damaged. Dendy sued Wells and his practice, Duncan Wells, M.D., P.C. d/b/a Atlas Orthopedics for medical malpractice, alleging that the defendant violated the applicable standard of care by clamping a retractor on the plaintiff’s sciatic nerve during the surgery. A jury returned a defense verdict, and the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for new trial. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the defendant repeatedly violated a motion in limine which prohibited the parties from using the personal practices of expert witnesses to establish the applicable standard of care. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In 2009, the Georgia Supreme Court in Condra v. Atlanta Orthopedics Group , 285 Ga. 667, 669-672 1 681 SE2d 152 2009, changed a long-standing rule prohibiting a medical malpractice expert from testifying about his personal practices. The court held that “evidence regarding an expert witness’ personal practices, unless subject to exclusion on other evidentiary grounds, is admissible both as substantive evidence and to impeach the expert’s opinion regarding the applicable stand of care.” Id. at 669 1. It concluded that the plaintiff in that case should have been allowed to cross-examine an expert witness about his personal practices, which differed from the standard of care he described. Id. at 669-672 1. Applying Condra , this court subsequently held in Griffin v. Bankston , 302 Ga. App. 647, 651-652 1 b 691 SE2d 229 2009, that a plaintiff could cross-examine a fact witness about his personal practices to refute the witness’s testimony that such practices would not have made a difference to the outcome in that case.
In this case, the plaintiff argues that Condra and Griffin “did nothing to change Georgia’s long-standing prohibition against admitting personal practices testimony on direct examination,” but only applied to cross-examination of an expert whose personal practices differed from the standard of care he espoused. Such testimony, argues the plaintiff, does not illuminate the standard of care, improperly leads the jury to believe that since the expert follows certain practices, those practices must fall within the proper standard of care, and “does nothing to illustrate a physician’s credibility.”
