Jason Pierce was indicted on September 28, 1999 for the murders of Patrice Lassiter and Monique Brown and the aggravated assault of Shunae Allen, as well as other offenses. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which specified certain statutory aggravating circumstances. In December 2003, Pierce pled guilty to two counts of malice murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murders and consecutive terms of years for the remaining offenses. Acting pro se in 2007, Pierce filed a motion for appointment of counsel, a motion to vacate a void and illegal sentence, and a “renewed” motion for appointment of counsel. In January 2008, Pierce filed an “amended” motion for out-of-time appeal, which was denied on February 28, 2008. On January 25, 2010, Pierce filed a motion to set aside the February 2008 order pursuant to Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co. , 246 Ga. 147, 148-149 1 269 SE2d 426 1980. On February 3, 2011, the trial court dismissed the motion for appointment of counsel in one order and denied all other pending motions in a separate order. Pierce directly appeals pro se from the latter order. See Rooney v. State , 287 Ga. 1, 3 2 690 SE2d 804 2010 denial of motion to vacate void sentence is directly appealable; Leventhal v. Moseley , 264 Ga. 891, 892 453 SE2d 455 1995 denial of Cambron motion to set aside, which is not enumerated in OCGA § 5-6-35 a, is directly appealable.
1. Pierce first enumerates the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to prosecute the motions for out-of-time appeal and to vacate a void and illegal sentence. We address this issue pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 d, although we note that a final decision refusing to appoint post-conviction counsel generally is itself directly appealable. Hight v. State , 308 Ga. App. 595, fn. 2 708 SE2d 555 2011.
