Michael L. Sledge appeals his convictions1 for driving under the influence and driving on a suspended license. He contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon the court’s earlier denial of his motion for a directed verdict on the driving on a suspended license charge. Sledge also contends his defense counsel was ineffective because he introduced a video of Sledge’s earlier traffic stop and because he did not object to leading questions by the prosecutor. Finding no error, we affirm Sledge’s convictions. 1. Sledge contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Because Sledge’s real complaint is that the trial court denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, we will consider his motion under the standards appropriate for such motions rather than the denial of his motion for new trial. Courts should examine the substance of a motion, rather than its nomenclature, to determine what sort of relief is sought. Thompson v. State , 274 Ga. 818 559 SE2d 730 2002 treating a motion to void judgments as a motion to withdraw guilty plea; Marshall v. State , 229 Ga. 841 1 195 SE2d 12 1972 there is no magic in nomenclature; substance controls our consideration of pleadings. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Under that standard we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only where there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal. OCGA § 17-9-1. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the State’s case, an appellate court considers not only the evidence produced in the State’s case-in-chief, but also any evidence introduced subsequent to the motion by the defense. Citations and punctuation omitted. Wilson v. State , 233 Ga. App. 327, 328 1 503 SE2d 924 1998. Sledge contends the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was notified that his license was suspended because the officer who was to have served the notice of suspension on him testified that she did not serve him personally as required.
Notice is an essential element of proving a violation of OCGA § 40-5-121 a. OCGA § 40-5-121a provides in pertinent part that “any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his privilege to do so is suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” This is a strict liability statute, and the state need not prove criminal intent. However, notice is required by OCGA § 40-5-60, which provides that “all revocations and suspensions provided for in this chapter shall be effective on the day the driver receives actual knowledge or legal notice thereof, whichever occurs first. Notice of suspension by operation of law shall be considered legal notice.” Footnote omitted. State v. Fuller , 289 Ga. App. 283, 283-284 656 SE2d 902 2008. In this regard,
