In this dispute over credit life insurance, the widow of the insured, individually and as executrix of his estate, appeals the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment against the insurer and the grant of the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on all of her claims. In its summary judgment order, the trial court concluded that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the insured decedent had made material misrepresentations regarding his health in his applications for credit life insurance coverage, thereby entitling the insurer to rescind coverage and deny the widow’s claims to the insurance proceeds. The trial court further concluded that an incontestability clause contained in the certificates of insurance, which limited the time period within which the insurer could rescind coverage based upon misrepresentations made by an insured, did not apply under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the widow was not entitled to recover the insurance proceeds, prejudgment interest, or bad faith penalties and attorney fees under OCGA § 33-4-6. Based upon the intent of the parties reflected in the language of the applicable certificates of insurance and group life insurance policy, we conclude that the incontestability clause applied such that the insurer could not deny or rescind coverage. Consequently, the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the widow on her claims to the insurance proceeds and prejudgment interest. However, because the insurer’s reasons for refusing to pay the insurance proceeds to the widow were erroneous, but not frivolous or unreasonable, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the widow’s claim for bad faith penalties and attorney fees. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review, with all reasonable inferences construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Citation omitted. Richardson v. Phillips , 302 Ga. App. 305 690 SE2d 918 2010. See OCGA § 9-11-56 c. With these principles in mind, we turn to the record in the instant case.
The Three Loans to the Decedent. The relevant facts are undisputed. Linda Smith Flynt is the widow of Gifford H. Flynt, Jr. and the executor of his estate. The decedent was a crop duster who died in the course of that work when his plane crashed on July 12, 2008. At the time of his death, the decedent had three outstanding loans with Pelham Banking Company the “Bank”, each of which was evidenced by a promissory note. Each of the three loans had been in effect for a number of years and each had been renewed periodically by the decedent. The three loans are discussed in detail below.
