In April 2007, appellant Pamela Sapp was injured in a car accident when her car was struck by a dump truck driven by David Lamb and owned by Lamb’s employer, Entra Demond Blackmon, d/b/a EDB Trucking. Sapp and her husband sued Lamb and EDB in Tift County Superior Court; the Sapps also filed a federal lawsuit against EDB’s insurer, appellee Canal Insurance Company. Thereafter, Canal filed a declaratory judgment action in Tift Superior Court, as to which the Sapps filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaration that the accident was not covered under the subject insurance policy. Specifically, Canal claimed that, because the accident undisputedly occurred outside the 50-mile radius-of-use limitation set forth in the insurance policy, injuries resulting from the accident were not covered under the policy. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted Canal’s motion, finding no coverage with respect to the Sapps’ claims, and dismissed with prejudice all claims against Canal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that EDB’s insurance policy was a basic automobile liability policy rather than a motor carrier policy; that the policy was thus not subject to statutory minimum liability limits imposed on motor carrier policies; and that the 50-mile radius-of-use limitation in the policy was therefore valid and operated to preclude coverage for claims arising out of the accident. Sapp v. Canal Ins. Co. , 301 Ga. App. 596 688 SE2d 375 2010. This Court granted the Sapps’ petition for writ of certiorari to consider the applicability of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, OCGA § 46-7-1 et seq., and the validity of the 50-mile radius-of-use limitation under the circumstances presented here. As explained more fully below, we find that the Motor Carrier Act does apply in this case and that the 50-mile radius-of-use limitation is thus invalid. Accordingly, we reverse. 1. The threshold issue in this case is whether the insurance policy issued to EDB by Canal was a motor carrier policy subject to Georgia’s Motor Carrier Act.1 The Court of Appeals found as a matter of fact that it was not, citing the absence of any evidence that EDB had ever obtained a motor carrier permit as required at the time under the Act and its implementing regulations and the lack of a “Form F” endorsement to the policy, which would have signified the policy’s status as a motor carrier policy. See Ross v. Stephens , 269 Ga. 266, 268-269 496 SE2d 705 1998.2 Though there appears to be no dispute that EDB failed to obtain the permit required to operate as a motor carrier and that the insurance policy did not include a Form F endorsement, we do not find these facts dispositive as to the applicability of the Motor Carrier Act.
“The state motor carrier acts were enacted to protect members of the general public against injuries caused by the negligence of a Georgia motor carrier.” Footnote omitted. DeHart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 270 Ga. 381, 385 1 509 SE2d 913 1998. A “motor carrier of property” is defined under Georgia law as “a motor common or contract carrier engaged in transporting property, except household goods, in intrastate commerce in this state.” OCGA § 46-1-1 8. A motor carrier, which may be classified either as a “common” or “contract” carrier,3 is one which “owns, controls, operates, or manages any motor propelled vehicle . . . used in the business of transporting for hire of persons or property . . . on the public highways of Georgia.” OCGA § 46-1-1 9 B; see also OCGA § 46-1-1 9 A. Transporting “for hire” is defined as “an activity wherein for payment or other compensation a motor vehicle and driver are furnished to a person by another person . . . .” OCGA § 46-1-1 6. As Canal states in its pleadings, EDB at the time of the accident “operated a dump truck business.” Specifically, as the undisputed evidence shows, EDB was in the business of furnishing a dump truck and driver, for compensation, to haul crushed rock and like materials on the public roadways of Georgia. There can thus be no dispute that EDB was at the relevant time a motor carrier of property under Georgia law.