We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Hathaway Dev. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. , 301 Ga. App. 65 686 SE2d 855 2009 and posed this question: Did the Court of Appeals err in its construction of the term “occurrence” as defined by the insurance policy in question Hathaway Development Co. “Hathaway”, a general contractor, sued its plumbing subcontractor, Whisnant Contracting Company, Inc. “Whisnant”, for negligent plumbing work at three job sites. Hathaway sought to recover the cost of repairs caused by Whisnant’s faulty workmanship. These costs went beyond those required to fix Whisnant’s plumbing mistakes per se; rather they were costs associated with water and weather damage to surrounding properties.
Whisnant failed to answer and, after the entry of a default judgment against Whisnant, Hathaway sought payment from Whisnant’s insurer, American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Company “AESLIC”. AESLIC denied liability, asserting that Hathaway’s claim was not covered under Whisnant’s commercial general liability “CGL” policy because it did not arise out of an “occurrence,” defined under the policy as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same, general harmful conditions.” In this regard, AESLIC argued that Whisnant’s negligent workmanship could not be deemed an “accident.” The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to AESLIC. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Whisnant’s faulty workmanship caused damage to the surrounding properties, the acts of Whisnant constituted “occurrences” under the CGL policy. An insurance policy is simply a contract, the provisions of which should be construed as any other type of contract. Hunnicutt v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. , 256 Ga. 611, 612 4 351 SE2d 638 1987. Construction of the contract, at the outset, is a question of law for the court. Deep Six, Inc. v. Abernathy , 246 Ga. App. 71, 73 2 538 SE2d 886 2000. The court undertakes a three-step process in the construction of the contract, the first of which is to determine if the instrument’s language is clear and unambiguous. Woody’s Steaks v. Pastoria , 261 Ga. App. 815, 817 1 584 SE2d 41 2003. If the language is unambiguous, the court simply enforces the contract according to the terms, and looks to the contract alone for the meaning. Id. Punctuation omitted. RLI Ins. Co. v. Highlands on Ponce , 280 Ga. App. 798, 800, 801 635 SE2d 168 2006.
