Frederick Lee Gude has been indicted for murder and related crimes. The State moved the trial judge, Judge Marvin Arrington, to recuse himself. Judge Arrington referred the State’s motion to recuse to the Chief Judge for the appointment of another judge to hear the matter. See USCR 25.3. After Judge Kimberly M. Esmond Adams was appointed to hear the State’s motion to recuse Judge Arrington, Gude moved Judge Adams to recuse herself. Gude’s motion to recuse set forth the following pertinent allegations: 1 Judge Adams previously served as “a paid senior prosecutor in the major felony division” of the district attorney’s office that indicted Gude “at the time of Gude’s arrest, indictment, and/or prosecution”; 2 “Judge Adams was an employee prosecutor of District Attorney Paul Howard,” the prosecutor who had filed the motion to recuse Judge Arrington; 3 “District Attorney Paul Howard gave financial and/or other support to the campaign to elect Judge Adams”; and 4 “Judge Adams owes a debt of gratitude to Paul Howard for her years as a prosecutor during the time Gude was being prosecuted.” Judge Adams denied Gude’s motion without referring the matter to another judge. For the reasons set forth below, we apply the right for any reason principle and affirm Judge Adams’s denial of Gude’s motion for her recusal, because Gude’s motion failed to allege facts which, if assumed true, would require Judge Adams’s recusal. However, we also remind Judge Adams of her ethical duty to recuse herself sua sponte if she is personally aware of any adequate grounds for doing so. 1. The Uniform Superior Court Rules provide as follows: When a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify, accompanied by an affidavit, the judge shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter and shall immediately determine the timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and make a determination, assuming any of the facts alleged in the affidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted. If it is found that the motion is timely, that the affidavit is sufficient and that recusal would be authorized if some or all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are true, another judge shall be assigned to hear the motion to recuse. Id. In the order denying Gude’s motion for her recusal, Judge Adams stated that Gude had
failed to meet the legal standard of recusal by failing to present any viable evidence that this Court has demonstrated bias against Gude, or will in the future, in presiding over the hearing to recuse Judge Arrington. Even assuming the allegations in counsel’s affidavit were true, as mandated by USCR 25, the motion and accompanying affidavit fall short of the mark. We find that this reasoning fails to support the denial of Gude’s motion. The necessity for recusal is not limited to circumstances where actual bias has been demonstrated. Instead, recusal is also required, under judicial ethics standards, whenever a trial judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned .” Birt v. State , 256 Ga. 483 4 350 SE2d 241 1986 emphasis in original punctuation and citation omitted. We find that Judge Adams’s order unduly focused on whether she had or would demonstrate actual bias and that the order failed to address whether Gude’s allegations, if assumed true, were such that Judge Adams’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
