On August 1, 2006, a tax deed to real property located in the City of Savannah was executed in favor of Brown Investment Group, LLC. The City determined that a vacant building on the property was unsafe and demolished it on July 25, 2007. Brown brought suit against the mayor and aldermen of the City for the full value of the destroyed building, alleging that the City failed to give it prior notice of the demolition. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the ground that Brown “has failed to bar the right to redeem the property and therefore, has no standing to seek damages against the City.” The Court of Appeals affirmed on an alternative basis, holding that, when the building was demolished, the absolute 12-month right of redemption under OCGA § 48-4-40 1 had not expired and, as a result, Brown held neither legal title nor the right of possession and therefore lacked standing to sue the City for trespass. Brown Investment Group v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah , 303 Ga. App. 885 695 SE2d 331 2010. We granted certiorari to review that ruling. ” ‘To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.’ Cits.” Coffin v. Barbaree , 214 Ga. 149, 151 103 SE2d 557 1958. See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 2 316 SE2d 537 1984. It is well-settled that the title acquired by the purchaser of a tax deed is “ not a perfect fee simple title, but rather an inchoate or defeasible title subject to the right of redemption. Cit.” BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185 , 285 Ga. 5, 7 673 SE2d 205 2009. See also Mark Turner Properties v. Evans , 274 Ga. 547, 548 1 554 SE2d 492 2001. As Justice Lumpkin observed, “the nature of the title which he has may be compared to an estate which will ripen upon a condition, or rather, perhaps, to one which will be defeated upon the happening of a condition.” Bennett v. Southern Pine Co. , 123 Ga. 618, 622-623 51 SE 654 1905. See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , supra.
The purchaser ” ‘has consequently no constructive possession of the premises, and no more right to go upon and make use of them than any stranger to the title would have.Cits.” Elrod v. Groves , 116 Ga. 468, 470 42 SE 731 1902. See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , supra. A tax deed does not entitle a purchaser to possession as a matter of law or right until the right to redemption is terminated. National Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co. , 277 Ga. 41, 43 1 586 SE2d 235 2003; McDonald v. Wimpy , 206 Ga. 270, 273 4 56 SE2d 524 1949. “ He is not entitled to possession, or to rents, issues, and profits, during the time allowed for redemption. Cit.” Bennett v. Southern Pine Co. , supra at 622. See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , supra. ” ‘His entry upon the premises would be a trespass upon the possession, actual or constructive, of the owner, who might recover against him for any injury committed.’ Cits.” Elrod v. Groves , supra. See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , supra.
