Ander Tucker and his son, Richard Tucker, filed a complaint against Tift County, its Board of Commissioners, the individual commission members, and Carl Fortson, the county Director of Code Administration collectively, “the County defendants”, alleging a variety of claims arising out of a resolution issued by the county Zoning Board of Appeals “the Board” allowing manufactured homes to be placed on property owned by Larry G. Massey and Tony Massey.1 We granted the County defendants’ application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. We reverse. Because the Tuckers failed to challenge the underlying zoning decision in a timely manner, their claims against the County defendants are time-barred. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, warrant judgment as a matter of law. On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the record, construing the evidence and all inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmoving party.2 So viewed, the record shows that in February 2004, the county issued two permits to allow manufactured homes to be placed on the Masseys’ land. In April 2004, Ander Tucker, who lives on neighboring land, filed an appeal with the Board to challenge the issuance of the permits. At the hearing held on the appeal, both Ander and Richard Tucker argued that the issuance of the permits violated county zoning ordinances concerning required lot size in land zoned for agricultural use. No decision was rendered. Meanwhile, Larry Massey applied for variances that, if granted, would allow the Masseys to re-plat their land without complying with the zoning ordinance’s street frontage requirements. On May 27, 2004, the Board held a hearing, at which the Tuckers appeared with counsel. A motion was made to approve the variances. On June 15, 2004, the Board issued a resolution that affirmed the county’s issuance of the manufactured home permits and granted Larry Massey’s request for variances. The Tuckers did not appeal the Board’s decision. Instead, more than three years later, on April 10, 2007, the Tuckers filed the instant action in superior court against the County defendants and the Masseys, alleging fraud, wilful misrepresentation, conspiracy, nuisance, negligent failure to perform ministerial duties, vicarious liability, and civil rights violations. All claims related to the Board’s June 2004 resolution. The Tuckers alleged that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the variances and permits; that Fortson failed to enforce existing zoning ordinances; that the County defendants engaged in a pattern of fraud and deception by causing the Masseys to apply for variances and by concealing alleged misconduct; and that the County defendants conspired to deny the Tuckers access to the courts and other privileges and immunities, in violation of federal civil rights laws. They prayed for an injunction that would essentially rescind the manufacturing housing permits issued for the Masseys’ property. The Tuckers also sought damages, including punitive damages and attorney fees. The County defendants sought summary judgment on a number of grounds, including the Tuckers’ failure to appeal the Board’s resolution. The trial court denied the motion without explanation, but certified its order for immediate review. This appeal followed.
The County defendants correctly argue that the claims against them are time-barred. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-3-20, appeals to superior court must be filed “within 30 days of the date the judgment, order, or decision complained of was entered.”3 This Code section applies to an appeal from a county zoning board’s decision.4 The requirement is jurisdictional, so that a superior court lacks jurisdiction when such an appeal is filed beyond the time allowed by law.5 The 30-day period commences upon “the signing of the initial document reducing the decision to writing.”6 In this case, the appeal period commenced on June 15, 2004, the date that the Board entered a resolution allowing manufactured homes to be placed on the Masseys’ property. The Tuckers’ complaint against the County defendants, filed nearly three years later, is thus untimely. The Tuckers argue that their suit is not an appeal of the zoning decision, but instead raises independent tort claims. A review of the complaint shows otherwise. The complaint states: “Plaintiffs hereby file this suit and, further, hereby appeal to the Superior Court from the prior decisions of the Board, the zoning administrator and the Tift County Commissions sic refusing to enforce and apply the zoning and land use provisions.”7