Dante Terrance Shields was tried by jury and convicted of several crimes in connection with a home invasion and attempted armed robbery in Hall County.1 Shields then moved for a new trial, claiming that he was deprived at trial of the effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer, among other things, misunderstood the number of peremptory strikes to which he was entitled during jury selection and failed to object to certain evidence that reflected badly upon Shields’s character.2 After the trial court denied his motion for a new trial, Shields brought this appeal. We see no error and affirm. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Shields must prove both that the performance of his lawyer at trial was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 III 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 1984. To prove that the performance of his lawyer was deficient, Shields must show that his lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687-88; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 381 III C 106 SC 2574, 91 LE2d 305 1986. And to prove that he was prejudiced by the performance of his lawyer, Shields must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland , supra, at 694 III B; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 391 III 120 SC 1495, 146 LE2d 389 2000. This burden, although not impossible to carry, is a heavy one. See Kimmelman , supra, at 382 III C. We think Shields has failed to carry his burden.
1. We begin with Shields’s claim that his lawyer was ineffective because he misunderstood the number of peremptory challenges to which Shields was entitled during jury selection. Under OCGA § 15-12-165, a defendant charged with a felony for which the State does not seek the death penalty may exercise nine peremptory challenges in the selection of the jury, and the State is entitled to the same number. Shields’s lawyer, however, mistakenly believed that Shields was only entitled to six peremptory challenges. Although Shields’s lawyer asked the trial court whether each party would be entitled to exercise six peremptory challenges, the trial court either shared his mistaken belief that six was the usual number of challenges or misunderstood that the parties, although entitled to more challenges, had agreed to exercise no more than six each: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, we’re going to pick a jury at 12:00 with six strikes a side and then two alternates with how many strikes THE COURT: I’m going to let you pick a jury of 12 and then three alternates if I have —still have the right number of jurors to allow you to do that. DEFENSE COUNSEL: With six strikes a side to pick the 12 THE COURT: Correct. In any event, Shields’s lawyer proceeded to strike a jury with the understanding that he had six peremptory challenges. Shields’s lawyer ultimately exercised only five of these challenges.
