This is the second appearance of this case before us. In D.C. Micro Development v. Lange , 259 Ga. App. 611 578 SE2d 251 2003 “D.C. I “, we affirmed the trial court’s appointment of a receiver over the corporate defendants, D.C. Micro Development and TopDog Software, Inc. Id. at 613-614 2. In this appeal, the corporate defendants and their principal, David Cecil, collectively, “D.C.” challenge the trial court’s order setting compensation for the appointed receiver, Brandyn Briley. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not err in any of the particulars urged by D.C. We therefore affirm. In D.C. I , we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver because the evidence showed “possible financial improprieties” by D.C., including attempts to circumvent the trial court’s earlier order instructing D.C. to preserve and account for its assets and “the possibility that the corporations’ assets were being diverted and that assets might be dissipated before the case could be resolved.” Punctuation omitted. Id. at 613 2. By order of March 15, 2002, the trial court designated the powers of the receiver as auditing and reconciling the accounts of the corporations, including assuming control of their day-to-day operations, processing sales and licensing, and establishing an operating account to manage any monies received by the corporations.
In 2008, the trial court entered an order seeking a status update and then an order setting a “Hearing on Notice of Intent to Liquidate Assets Held by Receiver.”1 At that hearing, the trial court received evidence showing the work performed by Briley and the amounts billed, and questioned Briley at length and in detail regarding her qualifications, the work she performed as receiver, the hourly rates billed by her and her employees, and the value of the assets she was appointed to oversee. Briley sought approximately $178,000 in fees, contending that the large amount was justified by D.C.’s continuing attempts to conceal assets and transfer them out of state. D.C. appeared at the hearing and argued that the receiver should be awarded no fees whatsoever on the basis of her failure to comply with a court order to produce documentation of her fees to the parties and mediator in an earlier mediation. Appellant Cecil appeared at the hearing and testified, and also was questioned at some length by the trial court.
