This case arises from an application for confirmation of a foreclosure sale filed pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-161 by Sea Island Bank against Henderson Property Holdings, LLC, Edwin J. Feiler, Jr., and Andrew B. Feiler collectively “Henderson Property Holdings”. Henderson Property Holdings appeals the trial court’s final order confirming the sale of three adjacent parcels of commercial property in the amounts of $1,030,000; $1,090,000; and $1,680,000. Finding no error, we affirm. Value on the date of sale is a factual question to be resolved by the trier of fact. In a proceeding for confirmation of a foreclosure sale of real property, the judge sits as a trier of fact, and his findings and conclusions have the effect of a jury verdict. Where the trial judge, sitting as the trier of the facts, hears the evidence, his finding based upon conflicting evidence is analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support it.1 So viewed, the record reveals that Sea Island Bank hired Timothy C. Wilson to appraise the property in July 2009 and January 2010 for the foreclosure sale. His July 2009 appraisals, which were based on “what he thought would have been a typical reasonable marketing time” of 24 to 36 months, amounted to $1,800,000; $1,850,000; and $2,850,000. In January 2010, Sea Island Bank instructed Wilson to update his July 2009 appraisals and reevaluate the parcels assuming a reasonable marketing period of 12 months, as well as an appraisal “based on what he thought was the typical marketing. . . an estimate of 24 to 36 months.” Wilson stated that the twelve-month time period was “what most sellers were requiring.” Using the 24- to 36-month marketing periods, he appraised the properties to be valued at $1,590,000; $1,685,000; and $2,550,000. Using the 12-month marketing period provided by Sea Island Bank, Wilson appraised the properties at $1,030,000; $1,090,000; and $1,680,000.
The numbers from the 12-month marketing period and 24- to 36-month marketing periods, however, represented the same return. Wilson relied upon comparable sales to arrive at the fair market value. Wilson took the independent analysis based upon the 24- to 36-month periods and applied discounts arising from a hypothetical purchaser’s “reasonable expectation of certain costs and taxes” to account for time and marketability These downward adjustments reflected eighteen months of carrying costs, including a fifteen percent deduction for developer/entrepreneurial profit, real estate taxes, and sales fees; one percent deduction for “miscellaneous”; and a discount rate of ten percent, which accounted for opportunity costs of the owner.
