In this products liability action, Shirley Andrews sued Ford Motor Company and Langdale Ford Company “the Ford companies” in the Superior Court of Lowndes County for property damages she sustained when her 2002 Ford Expedition caught fire in her garage and for punitive damages. After a hearing on the Ford companies’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that Andrews is not entitled to recover from the Ford companies for damages to her car, her home, and her home’s contents to the extent that she previously received compensation for those damages from her insurers, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company collectively, “State Farm”. Based on this determination, the trial court granted summary judgment in part to the Ford companies and noted that, “in the event the jury returns a verdict in favor of Andrews that exceeds the amount she previously received from State Farm, the court, in preparing the judgment, will reduce the jury’s verdict by the amount of compensation for items previously paid by State Farm.” The trial court effectively denied the Ford companies’ motion for summary judgment as to Andrews’ claim for punitive damages, noting “nothing contained in this order shall prohibit Andrews from asserting a punitive damages claim against both of the Ford companies.” In addition, the trial court ruled that Andrews is entitled to present evidence at trial as to the property damage she sustained and that the Ford companies are not entitled to present evidence as to any compensation paid by State Farm or any other collateral sources. In Case No. A11A0579, Andrews appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the Ford companies because the trial court should have applied the collateral source rule to prevent the introduction of any evidence of insurance payments she received from State Farm. She also contends the trial court erred in granting the insurers’ motion to intervene.1
In Case No. A11A0778, the Ford companies, as cross-appellants, contend the trial court erred in ruling that, despite its partial grant of summary judgment denying Andrews’ the right to recover from the Ford companies those property damage amounts paid to her by State Farm, Andrews could still introduce at trial evidence related to the damage to her car and home and could still seek punitive damages. The Ford companies argue that implicit in the trial court’s ruling is a finding that, by accepting State Farm’s payments for the damages sustained, Andrews’ right to sue passed to State Farm by assignment and subrogation and that Andrews no longer had standing to sue for those losses.
