The child advocate hereinafter “appellant” of seven-year-old J. F. appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the deprivation complaint instituted by the Dekalb Department of Family and Children Services “DFACS”.1 The appellant contends that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of evidence to the probable cause hearing. We do not agree and upon our review affirm the order of the juvenile court. On appeal, this court defers to the juvenile court’s factfinding. See In the Interest of R. N. R. , 257 Ga. App. 93 1 570 SE2d 388 2002. We neither weigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. So viewed, the evidence shows that on February 5, 2010, DFACS received a referral for J. F. from the Dekalb County Police Department after the police were notified by J. F.’s doctor that the child was infected with chlamydia. Upon their investigation, police suspected that a maternal uncle living at the child’s residence was the perpetrator. The uncle was arrested on the same day as the referral, and later deported. J. F. tested negative for chlamydia on February 24, 2010, but a third test on April 8, 2010 was positive. On April 13, 2010 the Dekalb County Police Department filed a Complaint for Deprivation as to J. F. , and the child was taken into DFACS’s custody. A detention hearing on the deprivation complaint was scheduled for April 16 and continued until April 26, 2010, at which time DFACS moved to dismiss the claim because the mother and step-father had tested negative for chlamydia and were cooperating with authorities. The court subsequently dismissed the complaint, and issued its order on May 10, 2010, finding, in part, that “there was no threat to the child in the home.”
The guardian ad litem filed an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration on the same day, and filed a new complaint for deprivation with the same allegations. On April 27, 2010, the trial court held an emergency hearing on the motion to reconsider and the new deprivation complaint. The notice of appeal was filed May 13, 2010 as to the May 10th order, and the trial court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the second complaint in an order filed on June 2, 2010. However, the juvenile court was divested of jurisdiction to rule on the motion for reconsideration upon filing of the notice of appeal. State v. White , 282 Ga. 859, 860 1 655 SE2d 575 2008. Thus, the June 2 order is ineffective and cannot be considered on appeal.
