Based on evidence that Dustin Denard Davis brutally attacked his wife, a Gwinnett County jury convicted him of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, family violence battery, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Davis appeals from the order denying his second amended motion for new trial, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We disagree and affirm. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency so prejudiced defendant that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct.1 “We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.”2 1. Davis first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, including the knife he used to threaten his wife, discovered during a warrantless search of his residence. “When trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress is the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.”3 Davis has failed to make this showing.
The evidence shows that Davis’s wife signed a form consenting to the search of the marital residence. Davis argues that the consent was invalid because it was given after his wife vacated the home, rendering her a “nonresident” for Fourth Amendment purposes.4 The record shows, however, that Mrs. Davis executed the consent form on the very day that she fled to her uncle’s house and called the police. Davis has cited no authority for the proposition that Mrs. Davis relinquished all interest in the marital residence at the moment she fled the home with her baby and belongings. The case he relies upon, Wilson v. State ,5 is wholly inapposite. In Wilson , we upheld a burglary conviction based, in part, on evidence that the defendant lacked authority to be in his girlfriend’s home.6 Although the defendant had resided there, he was not a party to his girlfriend’s lease, did not have a key to her home, and did not have her permission to be there at the time of the offense. In the case at bar, Davis made no showing at the hearing held on his second amended motion for new trial that his wife lacked authority to consent to a search of the marital residence. Wilson does not support his argument.