Following a jury trial, Eric Johnson appeals his conviction for felony murder, theft by receiving stolen property, felony fleeing and attempting to elude police, and aggravated assault, contending, among other things, that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on November 7, 2002, Johnson led police on a high-speed chase while driving a stolen car. After running red lights and hitting another vehicle along the way, Johnson drove the stolen car across the center line of the road and crashed into the car being driven by Robert Hairston. Although alert at the scene, Hairston died at the hospital three days later when a blood clot in his leg traveled to his lungs. The medical examiner testified that he believed that the blood clot formed while Hairston was kept immobilized to treat his injuries. Similar transaction evidence was also admitted showing that Johnson led police on a high-speed chase in another stolen vehicle less than a year earlier.
This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to determine that Johnson was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979. Johnson attempts to avoid this result, however, by arguing both that the collision was merely an accident rather than an aggravated assault and that theft by receiving a stolen vehicle cannot serve as a predicate for felony murder because it is not an inherently dangerous act. Johnson argues that, as a result, his convictions for aggravated assault, felony murder based on aggravated assault, and felony murder based on theft by receiving a stolen vehicle must be overturned. These contentions, however, have previously been decided adversely to Johnson in Turner v. State , 281 Ga. 487 640 SE2d 25 2007. With regard to aggravated assault, Johnson maintains that the evidence shows he had no specific intent to injure anyone. The State, however, is not required to prove specific intent; the issue is whether defendant possessed a general intent to injure. See Durrance v. State , 250 Ga. App. 185 2 549 SE2d 406 2001. “Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used. The question of whether an automobile has been used in such a manner . . . is one for the jury to resolve.” Id. at 187. The jury was authorized to infer from Johnson’s conduct that he had an intent to injure Hairston, or anybody who was in his way while he attempted to elude police. Turner , supra, 281 Ga. at 489 1 b.
