The victim Bryan Evans went to a house owned by appellant Muhammad Omar Rafi in order to buy drugs using a counterfeit hundred dollar bill. An eyewitness testified that appellant drove up to where the victim was standing just outside the house, approached the victim and had words about the counterfeit money, pistol whipped the victim, and shot the victim while the victim was prone on the ground.1 Appellant then fled. The victim died from a bullet wound to the neck that caused his airway to collapse. 1. The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979.
2. Appellant alleges he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We disagree. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . .” This right is enshrined in the Georgia Constitution and is co-extensive with the federal guarantee made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIa; Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 522 663 SE2d 189 2008. Every constitutional speedy trial claim is subject to a two-tiered analysis as set forth in the United States Supreme Court decisions Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972 and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647II 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992. As for the first tier of the analysis, it must be determined if the delay in question is presumptively prejudicial. If not, there has been no violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the second tier of analysis is unnecessary. See Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. at 530 “Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”; Bowling v. State , 285 Ga. 431a 673 SE2d 194 2009. If, however, the delay is determined to be presumptively prejudicial, then the court must engage the second tier of analysis by applying a four-factor balancing test to the facts of the case. Jakupovic v. State , 287 Ga. 2051 695 SE2d 247 2010. Those four factors include: 1 whether the delay is uncommonly long; 2 reason for delay/whether the government or the defendant is more responsible; 3 defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4 the prejudice to the defendant. Ruffin v. State , supra, 284 Ga. at 562b. On appeal, the relevant standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 65; Bowling v. State, supra, 285 Ga. at 472. Brewington v. State , 288 Ga. 520 1 705 SE2d 660 2011.
