Appellant Ian Grady challenges his conviction for violating an Athens-Clarke County “County” ordinance regulating the volume of noise from “mechanical sound-making devices.” He contends that the provision is facially invalid under the free speech clause of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V “No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”. The trial court rejected his claim, and we affirm. 1. On Friday night, April 17, 2009, Grady hosted a party at his apartment in downtown Athens, apparently to celebrate his admission to law school. Grady’s residence is in a mixed-use zone that includes a hotel and residential buildings alongside commercial ones. At 3:30 a.m. on Saturday morning, an Athens-Clarke County police officer cited Grady for violating local ordinance § 3-5-24. That law prohibits, among other things, noise from “mechanical sound-making devices” or from a “party” that is “plainly audible” 100 feet away from a person’s property limits between midnight and 7 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday. There were no noise complaints about the party, but the officer was patrolling the area and heard loud music from over 170 feet away. This was unusual, the officer later testified, because downtown Athens is typically a “ghost town” at 3:30 a.m.
The solicitor later amended Grady’s citation to specify violations of § 3-5-24 c 2 a mechanical sound-making devices and c 2 d party noise. Grady proceeded to trial before the municipal court, arguing, among other things, that these provisions of the ordinance were facially invalid under the Georgia Constitution’s free speech clause. The municipal court acquitted Grady of violating subsection c 2 d but convicted him of violating subsection c 2 a and fined him $350. Grady filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the superior court. After a hearing, that court affirmed. Grady then filed an application for discretionary review, which we granted to consider the constitutionality of § 3-5-24 c 2 a.1