Christopher Smith was charged with armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Smith pled guilty to robbery by intimidation and was sentenced as a first offender to 15 years with the first 10 years to be served in confinement.1 Three weeks later, Smith moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement or the consequences of his plea. The trial court denied Smith’s motion, and he now appeals. We affirm. When a defendant challenges the validity of his guilty plea, the State must demonstrate that the defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered the plea. Rocha v. State , 287 Ga. App. 446, 448-449 2 651 SE2d 781 2007. It may do so by either 1 showing on the record of the plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights he was waiving and the consequences of his plea, or 2 filling a silent record with extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Acting as the factfinder, the trial court exercises its discretion in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and we will not disturb its ruling absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Citation, punctuation and footnotes omitted. Blackmon v. State , 297 Ga. App. 99 1 676 SE2d 413 2009.
Smith asserts that he believed his sentence under the First Offender Act required only probation and that he would not serve time in prison. If he had “correctly perceived the situation,” he claims he would not have pled guilty. He contends that his trial counsel informed him prior to the plea that he would not be eligible for first offender treatment, and that when he received his sentence under the First Offender Act, “he thought he was getting probation . . . rather than confinement.”
