Shaukat Sayani, who stands accused of aggravated assault and other offenses, appeals from an order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s delay in bringing the case to trial. Because the trial court denied the motion based on a legal error, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for the trial court to apply the appropriate test under a correct legal analysis. The record shows that in November 2006, Sayani allegedly assaulted and threatened Gita Mandel with a knife, held her against her will, and stole her cell phone. On December 26, 2006, Sayani was arrested for the alleged offenses, and the investigation of the crimes concluded in January 2007. In April 2009, the State indicted Sayani, and following the recusal of a trial judge and the reassignment of the case, Sayani waived arraignment in January 2010. Sayani moved to dismiss the indictment in March 2010, and following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in September 2010.
Under Barker v. Wingo 1 and Doggett v. United States ,2 an alleged denial of the right of an accused under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution requires a two-stage analysis. In the first stage of the analysis, the court must determine whether the pretrial delay is sufficiently long to be considered no longer ordinary but “presumptively prejudicial.” The pretrial delay is measured from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation 3 to the trial or, if the accused files a motion to dismiss the indictment, until the trial court denies the motion . If the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.4 The Barker-Doggett test involves a balancing of the following four factors: “1 whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, 2 whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, 3 whether, in due course, the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial, and 4 whether he or she suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.”5 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds for an abuse of discretion.6
