In these consolidated cases, Bernard Henry Robinson and Ralph Woods, Sr., were indicted for murder and other offenses in connection with the beating, stabbing, and shooting death of John Steven Mitchell. Robinson and Woods moved to dismiss their indictments on the grounds that their constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court denied these motions, prompting these appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The record shows that Robinson and Woods were arrested on January 12, 2008, and that on May 20, 2008, the State filed a Motion to Disqualify the Circuit Defender’s Office from representing the defendants due to a conflict of interest. On May 22, 2008, the trial court agreed to continue any hearing on the disqualification issue based on the Circuit Defender’s request to obtain an informal advisory opinion on the conflict issue from the State Bar of Georgia. Almost four months later, on September 8, 2008, the Circuit Defender received the advisory opinion from the State Bar, which indicated that a conflict of interest may exist, and that the problem should be resolved by bringing in public defenders from other counties to represent the defendants. On September 22, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held, and the Circuit Defender indicated that he would withdraw from the case and have new counsel appointed for Robinson and Woods within a week. The Circuit Defender withdrew from representing Robinson and Woods at that time, subject to new counsel being appointed by the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council or by the Circuit Defender himself bringing in public defenders from other counties. When no new counsel had been appointed within the next week, on October 1, 2008, the prosecutor wrote a letter to the trial judge to remind him of the need for the prompt appointment of new counsel for the defendants. On October 20, 2008, less than a month after the hearing on the Circuit Defender’s potential conflict of interest, current counsel were appointed to represent the defendants. Thereafter, the scheduled trials for the defendants were continued three times. Trials scheduled for the weeks of December 15, 2008 and January 5, 2009 were continued because, on December 15, 2008, the trial court ruled that the Circuit Defender was disqualified from representing Keith Williams, Robinson and Woods’ other co-defendant, and new counsel had not yet been appointed for Williams;1 and the trial scheduled for May 4, 2009 was continued because the prosecutor was scheduled to be out of the country during that week. By the time the case was set for a trial that was to commence on the week of July 27, 2009, a total of eighteen months had elapsed since the date of the defendants’ arrest. Woods filed his motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial on July 21, 2009, and Robinson filed his motion on July 23, 2009. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions.
1. The defendants’ constitutional speedy trial claims must be analyzed under the rubric of Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972. Under Barker ‘s four-part balancing test, the Court must consider: “1 the length of the delay; 2 reasons for the delay; 3 defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4 the prejudice to the defendant. Standing alone, none of these factors are necessary to a finding of deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, but they should be considered together in a balancing test.” Citations omitted. Layman v. State , 284 Ga. 83,84 663 SE2d 169 2008. See also Vermont v. Brillon , __U.S.__ II 129 SC 1283, 173 LE2d 231 2009 “Barker established a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed” citation and punctuation omitted. The trial court’s denial of a motion for discharge and acquittal based on an alleged speedy trial violation is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard on appeal. Burns v. State , 265 Ga. 763 462 SE2d 622 1995.
