Fifty-eight-year-old Willie Pattman was admitted to BJC Medical Center on August 8, 2003, for gastrointestinal bleeding and died the following day. His surviving spouse and the administrator of his estate, Mary Alice Pattman, filed a wrongful death action against Lorraine Dale Mann, R. N., Roberta Faye Samet Keller, R. N., and Banks, Jackson, Commerce Hospital and Nursing Home Authority d/b/a BJC Medical Center collectively “appellees”, alleging that appellees’ failure to obtain blood and administer a blood transfusion in a timely manner, as ordered by Mr. Pattman’s treating physician, caused Mr. Pattman’s death. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, ruling that Pattman’s claims sounded in professional negligence —not ordinary negligence —which required an affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1. Pattman appeals, contending generally that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her ordinary negligence claim. We disagree and affirm. To prevail at summary judgment . . . , the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiff’s claim, that claim tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered immaterial. . . . If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.1 We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, construing the evidence most favorably to the nonmovant.2 So viewed, the evidence shows that on August 8, 2003, Mr. Pattman went to his cardiologist, Dr. Narasimhulu Neelagaru, to obtain treatment for rectal bleeding.3 Dr. Neelagaru, who previously had prescribed the blood thinner Coumadin for Mr. Pattman’s cardiac condition, diagnosed him with gastrointestinal bleeding and admitted him to BJC Medical Center “BJC” at approximately 6:00 p.m. At BJC, Mr. Pattman received treatments ordered by Dr. Neelagaru and a physician’s assistant. At approximately 6:00 a.m. on August 9, 2003, Dr. Neelagaru ordered fresh frozen plasma and a blood transfusion; however, because Mr. Pattman had rare antibodies in his blood, the blood had to be obtained from the American Red Cross in Atlanta, which also tested a sample of Mr. Pattman’s blood for antibody identification and cross matching. In the meantime, Mr. Pattman received continuing medical treatment, including the fresh frozen plasma and other medications while the ICU awaited delivery of the blood. At approximately 6:40 p.m., a courier service delivered the blood to BJC. According to Riczen Mamites, the medical technologist on duty in the BJC laboratory at the time the blood was delivered, when blood arrives at the hospital it is retyped, a process that takes 15 to 30 minutes. Mamites testified that the blood would have been ready by 7:30 p.m. at the latest, and that he called the ICU to pick it up but that no one came. According to appellee Lori Mann, the nurse on duty in the ICU from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. on August 9, the laboratory never called to advise that the blood had arrived or that it was ready for pick up. Appellee nurse Keller testified that she was on duty at 6:00 a.m. on August 9, when Dr. Neelagaru ordered a blood transfusion and that when she came back on duty at approximately 7:00 p.m., no blood transfusion had been given. At 7:27 p.m., Mr. Pattman experienced a cardiac arrest and died shortly thereafter. Pattman filed a wrongful death action on July 22, 2005, alleging that appellees committed professional negligence in their care and treatment of her husband. Although the complaint references an attached affidavit, filed in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, one is not attached to the complaint. However, in response to BJC’s request for production of documents, Pattman filed the affidavit of Andre Jawde, M. D., a cardiothoracic surgeon. Shortly thereafter, BJC moved to exclude Dr. Jawde’s expert testimony on the ground that he was not qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-9-67.1. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that Dr. Jawde lacked the requisite experience and knowledge in nursing and/or hospital laboratory operations to offer standard of care testimony against appellees. The trial court further ruled that Dr. Jawde’s opinion, that Pattman would not have died had he received a blood transfusion any time before he went into cardiac arrest, was speculative and lacked scientific support. Following this ruling, appellees moved for summary judgment, alleging that Pattman’s claim for professional negligence was unsupported by expert medical testimony. Pattman subsequently amended her complaint, alleging that Mann, Keller, and other BJC employees/agents committed ordinary negligence in failing to comply timely with Dr. Neelagaru’s orders to obtain and administer frozen plasma, vitamin K, and red blood cells. The trial court concluded that Pattman’s claims sounded in professional negligence, requiring expert testimony and, therefore, granted summary judgment to appellees. This appeal followed.
In three related enumerations of error, Pattman contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees because her wrongful death claim alleges only ordinary negligence. We disagree.