After he was indefinitely suspended from his employment as an Assistant Professor of Microbiology at Georgia Institute of Technology “Georgia Tech”, Paul Edmonds brought suit against Georgia Tech and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia “Board of Regents”. Edmonds also sued G. Wayne Clough Georgia Tech President, Gary B. Schuster Georgia Tech Provost and Vice-President for Academic Affairs, E. Kent Barefield Interim Dean of the College of Sciences at Georgia Tech, and John McDonald Chairman of the Georgia Tech School of Biology, asserting claims against these men in both their individual and their official capacities. Edmonds’s complaint asserted claims for: i violations of Georgia’s Whistleblower Act OCGA § 45-1-4 d 2; ii tortious interference with his contractual business relations with third-parties; iii breach of his employment contract; iv violation of his free speech rights; and v violation of his right to procedural due process. The complaint sought compensatory damages, as well as various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief, including the reinstatement of Edmonds’s employment and the restoration of his access to his office and laboratory space at Georgia Tech. After the appellees moved for summary judgment on all counts, Edmonds voluntarily dismissed his claims against President Clough and Dean Schuster, in their individual capacities, and his free speech claim. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees and against Edmonds’s on all of his remaining claims and Edmonds now appeals from that order. Finding that the trial court properly concluded that the appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Edmonds’s claims, we affirm.
On a “motion for summary judgment, it is the movant’s burden to show that no jury question remains as to any material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Punctuation omitted. Partain v. Oconee County .1 To obtain summary judgment, a defendant need not produce any evidence, but must only point to an absence of evidence supporting at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jones v. Board of Regents of the University System of Ga. 2
