In this appeal, defendant Stephen Marshall asserts the trial court erred in failing to find that the State violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial with regard to three separate offenses. He also contends his prosecution for felony murder is barred on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no error, we affirm. 1. Marshall was arrested and charged with felony murder in January 2004; he was indicted three months later. In December 2006 Marshall was indicted for child molestation; and in March 2007 he was indicted for armed robbery. While Marshall was awaiting trial for felony murder, he was housed in close proximity to Brian Nichols, who committed a series of murders when he escaped from custody in the Fulton County courthouse, and the district attorney believed he was a potential witness at Nichols’ trial. Accordingly, Marshall’s trial was delayed for several years, with Marshall’s knowledge and cooperation, to determine whether Marshall could provide helpful information or testimony in the Nichols case. Ultimately, the district attorney determined that Marshall would not be used as a witness.
Marshall made a speedy trial demand on April 24, 2009. At that time, the felony murder prosecution was delayed more than five years; the child molestation case was delayed approximately two and a half years; and the armed robbery case was delayed a little more than two years. In Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States identified four factors to be considered by a court in determining whether an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated . . . a the length of the delay, b the reason for the delay, c the defendant’s assertion of his right, and d the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U. S. at 530. The Supreme Court further stated that it regarded none of the factors as either a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial but rather that the factors should be considered together in a balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant. Washington v. State , 243 Ga. 329, 330 1 253 SE2d 719 1979. Because the length of delay of each of the cases brought against Marshall raises a threshold presumption of prejudice and triggers further inquiry, we examine Marshall’s speedy trial claims by applying these four factors. See Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992 delay is presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year.