Doreen Araya and Curtis Windham were married in 2002, separated in 2005, and divorced in 2008. The final divorce decree was entered after a bench trial and provided that the proceeds from the sale of a house that Ms. Araya had brought into the marriage, as well as bank and credit union accounts in her name, are her sole and separate property. In another order, the trial court also awarded $10,000 in attorney’s fees to Ms. Araya because Windham had been unnecessarily litigious. Windham filed an application for discretionary appeal, which was granted pursuant to this Court’s Pilot Project for domestic relations cases. 1. Windham contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the “source of funds” rule when it classified the proceeds from the sale of Ms. Araya’s pre-marital house as her sole and separate property. “Under this rule, a trial court ‘must determine the contribution of the spouse who brought the home to the marriage, and weigh it against the total non-marital and marital investment in the property’ Cits.” Snowden v. Alexander-Snowden , 277 Ga. 153 587 SE2d 54 2003. Contrary to Windham’s contention, it appears that the trial court did weigh Ms. Araya’s contribution against the non-marital and marital investment in the house. In its final order, the trial court found that Ms. Araya had purchased the house three years prior to the marriage, that she paid $2,000 in earnest money and $19,000 at the closing, that shortly after the marriage she withdrew $30,000 from her pre-marital retirement account to support the parties, and that she sold the house in 2006, after the parties had separated. The trial court also noted Windham’s claims that he made several mortgage payments and did handyman work around the house, but found that Windham was unemployed and that the parties were separated during large parts of the marriage, that he did not submit any proof of his alleged mortgage payments or handyman work, and that he did not present “one shred of evidence that he made any contributions to the house.” Based on these findings and a review of the record, it appears that the trial court correctly applied the legal principle that “only property acquired as a direct result of the labor and investments of the parties during the marriage is subject to equitable division. Cit.” Cit. Because Ms. Araya brought the house to the marriage, only the subsequent increase in the net equity attributable to marital contributions was a marital asset. Cit. Wright v. Wright , 277 Ga. 133 1 587 SE2d 600 2003.
To the extent that Windham contends that the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient and did not address the issue of appreciation in the value of the house, we note that neither party asked the trial court to make any findings of fact in its final order. Where, as here, a bench trial is held in a divorce action, the trial “court sits as the finder of fact and, as such, is charged with the responsibility of determining whether . . . a particular item is a marital or non-marital asset. . . . The final judgment and decree of divorce entered in the case at bar contains some findings of fact and the results of that process but does not contain all the findings of fact that clarify the rationale used by the trial court to reach its result. Cits. However, a superior court judge is not required to make findings of fact in a nonjury trial unless requested to do so by one of the parties prior to the entry of the written judgment cits.. . . . Inasmuch as the issues on appeal depend upon the factual determinations made by the trial court as the factfinder and neither party asked the trial court to make factual findings, we are unable to conclude that the trial court’s failure to make an equitable distribution of marital property to Windham was improper as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.” Cit. If, as it appears, the trial court found, as matter of fact, that the proceeds from the house sale were not marital property, then there was no error, as a matter of law, in failing to award Windham a portion of Ms. Araya’s separate assets. Dasher v. Dasher , 283 Ga. 436, 437 1 658 SE2d 571 2008.
