M&M Mortgage Co, Inc., a commercial mortgage broker, sued Grantville Mill, LLC claiming that Grantville breached a written contract to pay M&M a brokerage fee to obtain Grantville a loan in the amount of at least $2,500,000.00 to be secured by real property owned by Grantville. M&M also named various individuals as defendants based on personal guaranties of the brokerage fee.1 Grantville and the individual defendants denied liability; counterclaimed against M&M for fraud and slander of title; and moved to add Michael D. Randles, president of M&M, as a defendant and joint tortfeasor in the counterclaim. After the trial court granted the motion to add Randles, the case was tried in a bench trial. M&M and Randles appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Grantville and the individual defendants on M&M’s breach of contract claim and on the counterclaims. 1. Randles claims that, as to the counterclaims against him, venue was improper in the Coweta County Superior Court, where M&M filed the breach of contract action. After the Coweta County court granted the motion to add Randles as a defendant and joint tortfeasor in the counterclaim,2 and he was served in the action, he filed a motion asserting lack of venue in Coweta County and seeking to have the counterclaim against him severed and transferred to a court with venue in DeKalb County where he resided. See McCabe v. Lundell , 199 Ga. App. 639 405 SE2d 693 1991; McCormick v. Rissanen , 177 Ga. App. 623 340 SE2d 268 1986. The trial court denied the motion.
Under the Georgia Constitution, venue generally lies in a civil case in the county where the defendant resides. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI.; Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Hopson , 264 Ga. App. 123, 124 589 SE2d 696 2003. The venue provisions of the Constitution also provide that a suit against joint tortfeasors residing in different counties may be tried in either county. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV.; accord OCGA § 9-10-31. The counterclaim against M&M and Randles alleged they were joint tortfeasors, but neither of them resided in Coweta County. It was undisputed that Randles resided in DeKalb County. As to M&M, the record shows that it was a domestic corporation that maintained a registered agent and office in Fulton County and a “principal office” in DeKalb County, but maintained no office in Coweta County. For purposes of venue, M&M resided in Fulton County or DeKalb County we need not decide which, but not in Coweta County. OCGA § 14-2-510 b; Coastal Transport, Inc. v. Tillery , 270 Ga. App. 135, 136-138 605 SE2d 865 2004. Nevertheless, by filing the breach of contract action in Coweta County Superior Court, M&M submitted itself to that court’s jurisdiction and venue on the counterclaim. Kennestone Hosp. , 264 Ga. App. at 124-125. But that did not make M&M a resident of Coweta County for purposes of the constitutional venue provisions. Because M&M did not reside in Coweta County, the constitutional joint tortfeasor venue provision did not apply to subject Randles to trial with M&M on the counterclaim in Coweta County. As an individual resident of DeKalb County, Randles was entitled under the constitutional venue provisions to be sued in DeKalb County. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI. In the absence of proper venue on the counterclaim against Randles, the trial court erred in denying Randles’s motion to transfer to a proper venue. The judgment against Randles on the counterclaim is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of an order transferring the counterclaim against Randles to a proper venue. Miller v. Bryant , 266 Ga. 584, 585-586 468 SE2d 762 1996; Lee v. Xerox Corp. , 193 Ga. App. 432 387 SE2d 653 1989.
