This appeal arises from William and Lucy Hitch’s attempt to challenge a revocable license to build a dock on State property granted by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources “DNR” to the Hitches’ neighboring landowner, Jane Britt Vasarhelyi. This Court originally affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Hitches’ claims based on lack of standing,1 and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that judgment, holding that the Hitches had standing to challenge the license.2 The Supreme Court did not address the question of whether the trial court properly dismissed the Hitches’ complaint for failure to state claims for 1 declaratory judgment and mandamus, 2 unconstitutional taking, and 3 denial of due process and equal protection.3 Because we agree with the trial court’s dismissal, we affirm. The factual and procedural history are as this Court summarized in its prior opinion: According to the Hitches, in 2003, Vasarhelyi applied for a permit to build a dock extending from her property over State-owned tidewater beds and marsh lands. Vasarhelyi apparently was required to seek authorization from the Army Corps of Engineers. In November 2003, the Corps issued a “Joint Public Notice” regarding Vasarhelyi’s application, which invited interested persons to request a public hearing on the proposed project. The Hitches, who own property that adjoins Vasarhelyi’s land, wrote to the Corps, expressing their objections to the construction of the dock and requesting a hearing. The Corps subsequently learned that DNR had not approved the dock, and it denied Vasarhelyi’s application without holding a hearing. Vasarhelyi ultimately obtained a revocable license from the State of Georgia to construct the dock. Although several designs were proposed, the Coast Guard objected to a straight dock, and Vasarhelyi received permission to build a “dog leg” shaped dock. In October 2004, the Hitches filed a “Petition for Hearing,” seeking an administrative hearing with the Office of State Administrative Hearings “OSAH” in which they could challenge the dock permit. The State, however, responded that it would not forward the petition to OSAH since, with respect to the management of State tidelands, DNR acts pursuant to a delegation of authority from the Governor, who is exempt from the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act “APA”. On January 13, 2005, the Army Corps of Engineers sent the Hitches a letter informing them that the State had approved Vasarhelyi’s request for a dock permit and that the Corps was thus re-processing the application. The Hitches were informed that if they still wanted to request a hearing, they would need to do so before January 27, 2005. There is no evidence that the Hitches sought a hearing. Instead, they filed suit in superior court against Vasarhelyi and the State alleging that, if Vasarhelyi constructed the dock, it would interfere with their ownership rights as the dock would “impair and impinge upon their view of the marsh and Skidaway River.” The Hitches also alleged that construction of the dock “would . . . severely hamper the ability of the Hitches or their successors in interest to build a dock” on their property and would diminish the value of their property. The complaint contained numerous causes of action, including claims for: 1 declaratory judgment; 2 mandamus; 3 “unconstitutional taking”; 4 “regulatory taking and regulatory denial of due process”; 5 denial of due process; 6 “issuance of permit . . . contrary to the public interest”; 7 the State’s exceeding its “legal and equitable authority, considering improper factors, and failing to act correctly and equitably in issuing the subject permit/license”; and 8 an equal protection violation.4 The State moved to dismiss the complaint, which motion was granted by the trial court on the grounds that the Hitches lacked standing, that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and that the Hitches had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to standing and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, leaving the question of the correctness of the dismissal pending in this Court.
1. The Hitches contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims seeking i declaratory judgment that they were entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge “ALJ” under the APA, and ii mandamus compelling DNR to transfer the licensing decision to OSAH for a hearing by an ALJ. However, the Hitches identify no statutory authority for such a hearing, and we discern no reversible error.
