Carol and Robert Gliemmo Appellants brought a medical malpractice action against emergency room doctor Mark Cousineau, Emergency Medical Specialists of Columbus, P.C., and St. Francis Hospital, Inc. Appellees. After Appellees answered the complaint, Appellants filed a challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 51-1-29.5 c, which provides: In an action involving a health care liability claim arising out of the provision of emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department or obstetrical unit or in a surgical suite immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency department, no physician or health care provider shall be held liable unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the physician or health care provider’s actions showed gross negligence. The trial court rejected the constitutional challenge, but issued a certificate of immediate review. Appellants applied for interlocutory review, and this Court granted the application to consider the constitutionality of the statute. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. 1. Appellants contend that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 c is a special law that violates the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution because it sets forth a gross negligence standard of liability only for certain emergency care providers. The uniformity clause provides: Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV a. Thus, “to violate this constitutional provision, the statute in question must either be a general law which lacks uniform operation throughout the state or a special law for which provision has been made by existing general law.” Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm. , 253 Ga. 227, 229 2 319 SE2d 824 1984. This Court has found a statute to be a special law where it “deals with a limited activity in a specific industry during a limited time frame.” Lasseter v. Ga. Public Service Comm. , supra special law applied to only one power plant converting from petroleum to coal. See also Celotex Corp. v. St. Joseph Hosp. , 259 Ga. 108, 110 376 SE2d 880 1989 special treatment for certain asbestos claims. Conversely, ” ‘a law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable.’ Cit.” Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth. , 256 Ga. 627, 630 6 352 SE2d 378 1987. Indeed, a law operating uniformly throughout the State, but from which the General Assembly excepts certain persons or things, is still a general law. McAllister v. American Nat. Red Cross , 240 Ga. 246, 248 2 240 SE2d 247 1977.
In Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth. , supra, this Court rejected a claim that the Hospital Care for Pregnant Women Act, OCGA § 31-8-40 et seq., is an unconstitutional special law. That Act “requires certain hospitals to provide emergency care to pregnant women in labor. . . .” Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth. , supra at 627. Moreover, like OCGA § 51-1-29.5 c, that Act provides that there is no civil liability thereunder unless a physician, nurse, medical assistant, hospital or its agent or employee “has been grossly negligent in the provision of such services. . . .” OCGA § 31-8-44. In rejecting the claim that the Act is unconstitutional special legislation, this Court found that it “operates statewide and is applicable to all hospitals authorized to operate as provided in the statute.” Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth. , supra at 630 6.
