In 1968, for approximately $11,000, Cullen O. Price and his wife Sara purchased property in Twiggs County as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The warranty deed for the conveyance was recorded in April 1968. When Sara and Cullen Price divorced on July 13, 1973, a separation agreement in the final divorce decree gave Cullen Price a life estate in the property with the requirement Cullen Price convey the remaining interest to appellants Harold Lee Price and Margaret Price Jones, the couple’s children, as tenants in common. The divorce decree was not recorded for a number of years. In 1983, after Sara Price’s 1982 death, Cullen Price filed an “Affidavit of Facts Affecting Title,” falsely attesting that he had acquired full title to the property by right of survivorship. In September 2005, Cullen Price executed a quitclaim deed to his then wife, appellee Loraine Price, purporting to convey to her a one-half interest in the property for $1 and other valuable consideration. Nothing in the record shows that the $1 was paid or that any real estate transfer tax was paid at any time. The quitclaim deed was recorded on October 4, 2005. The couple simultaneously procured a loan for approximately $48,000 from appellee Mortgage Electronics Registrations Systems, Inc. MERS by encumbering the property through a security deed recorded on October 4, 2005.1 Two months later on December 11, 2005, Cullen Price died intestate. On September 1, 2006, appellee Lorraine Price petitioned for a year’s support, seeking to have the other half interest in the property set aside for her. Appellants objected and recorded the divorce decree on October 23, 2007, asserting that they had 100 interest in the property. The trial court held that Cullen Price had a life estate in the property that extinguished upon his death, that Cullen Price’s Affidavit of Facts Affecting Title was false, that appellees Lorraine Price and MERS were innocent bona fide purchasers for value, that appellants owned one half interest in the property and appellee Loraine Price the other half, and both interests were subject to the security deed conveyed to MERS. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. A final divorce decree which conveys property has the same force and effect as a deed and establishes title, whether or not the decree is recorded. Elrod v. Elrod , 231 Ga. 222 1 200 SE2d 885 1973; Richardson v. Park Avenue Bank , 173 Ga. App. 43 325 SE2d 455 1984; OCGA §9-11-70. Therefore, as of 1973, Cullen Price had a life estate interest and the appellants held the remainder interest. At the time Cullen Price executed the quitclaim deed, he could only convey an interest in his life estate. Rigdon v. Cooper , 203 Ga. 547, 555 47 SE2d 633 1948 “a life tenant can convey no greater title than he or she may own”. When Cullen Price died in December 2005, his life estate ended and the property did not come into his estate. Battey v. Bayard , 158 Ga. 11 123 SE 11 1924.
