In deprivation proceedings brought by the Department of Family and Children Services DFACS, the Haralson County Juvenile Court found that J. N. born August 27, 2005 and A. N. born March 2, 2004 were deprived children without proper care as a result of parental use of methamphetamine. The court removed the children from the parents’ custody shortly after J. N.’s birth, and approved a case plan pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-58 for reunification of the children with the parents. Based on a subsequent finding that the parents refused to comply with the court-ordered reunification plan, the court entered an order on August 14, 2007, granting DFACS motions pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-58 h and i to terminate reunification services and to enter an order placing the deprived children in the custody of relatives until the children’s eighteenth birthdays.1 On April 17, 2008, Paul Neese, the children’s biological father, filed a petition pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-40 b seeking modification of the August 14, 2007 order terminating reunification services and placing the children in the custody of relatives.2 The petition alleged that changed circumstances evidence that Neese had stopped abusing unlawful substances and participated in parenting instruction required in the best interest of the children that the order be modified by immediately transferring the children to his custody, or by ordering that he have regular visitation as part of a new plan to reunify him with the children. Neese filed the present direct appeal from the juvenile court’s order denying his modification petition. 1. We first address the jurisdictional basis for this direct appeal. Under OCGA § 5-6-34 a 11 the right to a direct appeal is established from “all judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders.” emphasis added. Subsection a 11 is effective for “all child custody proceedings and modifications of child custody filed on or after January 1, 2008.” Ga. L. 2007, 554, 569, § 8. Although Neese’s motion sought modification of the juvenile court’s custody order and was filed on April 17, 2008, we conclude that OCGA § 5-6-34 a 11 did not give Neese the right to a direct appeal from the order entered in these child deprivation proceedings.
The right in subsection a 11 to a direct appeal from orders or judgments in “child custody cases” plainly includes “child custody proceedings” as set forth in Chapter 9 of Title 19 Domestic Relations of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, where the custody of a child is directly at issue between the parents. It is unclear, however, whether the broad phrase “child custody cases” in subsection a 11 encompasses child deprivation proceedings in which the juvenile court enters a child custody order. See OCGA § 15-11-54 through § 15-11-58.1. In construing OCGA § 5-6-34 a 11 to determine which cases the legislature intended to include within the meaning of “child custody cases,” we presume that the statute was enacted with full knowledge of and with reference to existing statutory and case law, and we construe the statute in harmony with the existing law. Higdon v. City of Senoia , 273 Ga. 83, 86 538 SE2d 39 2000; Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen , 227 Ga. 1, 9 178 SE2d 868 1970. Child deprivation proceedings are brought on behalf of the child, focus on the needs of the child, and may include custody orders “best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child.” OCGA § 15-11-55 a; In the Interest of J. P. , 267 Ga. 492 480 SE2d 8 1997. Although child custody determinations may be necessary in a deprivation proceeding, “the proceeding itself is to determine whether the child is deprived and is not an action brought to decide custody matters.” Id. at 492; In the Interest of I. S. , 278 Ga. at 861 “Issues of deprivation and custody are separate and distinct.”; see In re M. C.J. , 271 Ga. 546 523 SE2d 6 1999 contrasting child custody proceedings between parents with child deprivation proceedings. In accordance with these distinctions, we find that “child custody cases” within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 a 11 does not include child deprivation proceedings in which a custody order was entered. This construction is consistent with the fact that the introductory paragraph of the General Assembly Act by which OCGA § 5-6-34 a 11 was enacted to establish the right to direct appeals in “child custody cases” states that it was intended “to provide for direct appeals in certain domestic relations cases.” Ga. L. 2007, p. 554. Child deprivation proceedings are not included within “domestic relations” cases under Title 19 of the Georgia Code.
